

THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

IN expressing his thanks to many who have kindly sent him their good wishes on his recent appointment to the Deanery of Winchester, the Editor feels that he must ask the indulgence of his readers for delay in various pieces of work which he had promised in connexion with the Journal. He hopes to overtake the arrears in due course: but for the time being he is very much occupied with other things, and cannot expect to do more than the necessary routine-work of editorship. His movements and addresses during the present month are given in a note under "Notes and Comments"; and he would be glad if all but essential correspondence, and particularly all articles submitted for publication (other than any already arranged for), might be withheld until February 1st.

Meanwhile, we wish our readers a Happy New Year. The year just ended has been of exceptional difficulty in matters political and economic; and perhaps the best that can be said is that at least large numbers of citizens of all classes have been set thinking who had been inclined hitherto to take this function of citizenship too lightly. In that case the present depression may mark a period of incubation such as must always precede the birth of new ideas in the body politic; we seem to see, for instance, in the able and independent writings of Major Walter Elliott many of the qualities of mind which distinguished the leading statesmen of the Victorian age. In ecclesiastical matters the chief event of the year has been the Lambeth Conference, and we hope to conclude next month the interesting series of reviews of its Report which have been appearing in these pages. It is also encouraging to observe that the past year has witnessed a decided increase in the number of men ordained to the Ministry; and such a turn of the tide may well give us fresh heart as we go forward into 1931.

IN DEFENCE OF HUNTING: A SERMON*

I

"Ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne." "They bind heavy burdens grievous to be borne and lay them on men's shoulders."
—Matt. xxiii. 4; Luke xi. 46.

I HAVE often wondered whether religious teachers are sufficiently aware of the extreme danger to religion which arises from the frame of mind described in these texts. It may be called Pharisaism. It may be called Rigorism. Its essence is that it condemns, in the name of religion, what is really innocent.

The subject has been recently brought back to my mind in a new and interesting context. An organized attack is being made upon some of those field sports—especially stag-hunting—which seem to me to be a good and wholesome element in our national life. Now this is the kind of subject which it is hard to deal with in the pulpit. Yet, when a question of right and wrong is raised which affects a large number of people, it is only proper that it should be seriously thought out on general principles. Let me, then, before returning to this special subject of field sport, deal with the general principles involved in the texts.

These texts condemn Rigorism both in the technical and the popular sense of that term.

In its technical sense Rigorism is connected with the doctrine of doubtful conscience. It is the doctrine of the "safe side." Its other name is Tutorism. It says: "When in doubt, take the side favouring the law, not the side favouring liberty. If you have any doubt about the lawfulness of any act, treat it as unlawful." If you reflect that this means in effect, "Give way to every scruple," you will see, on reflection, what a very bad guide Rigorism would be for practice.† I sometimes think that the very best thing the Church of Rome has done officially in recent centuries is its authoritative condemnation of Rigorism,‡ and in general, its gradual establishment of a

* For this sermon, prepared for the Chape' Royal service of Sunday, October 12, another was substituted in consequence of the disaster which had just occurred at Beauvais.

† See Tanqueray, *Synopsis Theol. Moral.*, vol. ii., § 378, etc.

‡ See Gury, *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis, Propositiones Damnatae*, Num. xiii. 3. In section 53 of the same book the various systems concerning Probability are thus defined: (i) Rigorism teaches that in doubt the safe side is always to be followed. (ii) Mitigated Tutorism that you may follow the side favouring liberty only if it is at the extreme of probability. (iii) Probabiliorism that you must take the safe side unless the opposite side is conspicuously more probable. (iv) Equiprobabilism that you must not follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally, or nearly equally, probable with the opposite. (v) Probabilism that you may follow the opinion

system under which practical doubt shall be laid aside. "In every doubtful case where the question simply concerns mere lawfulness (and is not a question of some result which absolutely has to be attained), you may follow an opinion which is certainly and substantially probable, even though the contrary be really more probable"; *i.e.*, if you are really in doubt and lack moral certainty, you may lawfully follow any course of which a serious and solid defence could be made. Such a maxim prevents that endless weighing of probabilities in which the scrupulous conscience wastes time and strength.

I am aware that all this aspect of what is called Moral Theology has been widely misunderstood. Is it not, men ask, a comfortable and easy way with sinners? Does it not furnish them with excuses for evading duty?

It should be recognized, then, that the maxim I have just quoted refers only to cases of genuine doubt. It in no way encourages an evasion of known duty. It is concerned with the discovery of the right way of dealing with *doubt*—*i.e.*, with cases where the duty is *not* clearly known.

It is important to get this distinction clearly into our minds. The Christian disciple is called to "bear the cross." It is said—and it is true—that the only call to which men will respond with enthusiasm is the call to self-sacrifice. But one condition of this enthusiastic response is that men should see that there is a real *reason* for the self-sacrifice. When, for example, in the late war men voluntarily joined the army, knowing well the risk involved—some of them not from a native love of adventure, but from a pure sense of duty—the response was so general because the call was so clear. The duty was one which the most ordinary man could understand. The call to the sacrifice involved in Christian discipleship is equally clear if it is properly explained. But all teaching which calls in the name of Christianity for *needless* self-restraint, for *useless* sacrifices, confuses the issue. Far from presenting the "bearing of the cross" as something which arises in the plain course of duty for every rational being, such teaching presents Christianity as a system of fanciful restraints, suitable to certain people of peculiar and quixotic temperament, but eminently unfitted for the normal man. The rule, "If you have a scruple about anything, be guided by that scruple," deserves the condemnation which the Roman Church has pronounced upon it; for no maxim could lead more surely to this fanciful conception of Christianity.

which is less safe and also less probable, so long as it has real and solid probability.
(vi) Laxism holds that it is always right to follow even slightly probable opinions.
(i) and (vi) are condemned. (See *Church Quarterly Review*, July, 1912.)

II

So much for Rigorism in its technical sense. In its popular sense Rigorism is familiar to us all. I can illustrate it by a story.

Some years ago a group of learned Anglicans—mainly, but not entirely, Anglo-Catholics—were discussing the mistakes made by well-meaning clergymen in advising on cases of conscience. The story was told of a woman who was troubled in conscience because, early in her married life, she had once, in a moment of passion, been unfaithful to her husband. Years after the sin had been committed, and after long fidelity to her husband, she asked the advice of a clergyman. The clergyman, without any knowledge of, or inquiry into, the temperament, character, or intelligence of the husband, advised that the woman should tell her husband of the long-past lapse. The grounds of this advice were presumably some romantic conception of the perfect confidence that should exist between husband and wife (which we should all admit to be desirable, but which we know would not always be promoted by such a confession). Or perhaps the advice was based on tags of nursery morality—"Make a clean breast of it," and so forth. The result of the advice was, as might have been foreseen, deplorable. But the interesting thing is that all those who heard the story (one of them a Bishop) condemned this amateur "direction." The general opinion was summed up in the remark that any system of Moral Philosophy or Theology, even the worst, would have saved the clergyman from so foolish a blunder. The story has also an interesting sequel. I told it to an intelligent layman. His comment was: "The clergyman certainly gave what I should call 'rotten' advice; but I should have thought that it was the advice that any Bishop would tell a clergyman he was bound to give." That answer reveals what, I am afraid, is a very common misconception: the notion that Christianity is essentially a rigoristic religion; that the Christian, if true to type, will always recommend self-sacrifice, however needless and however thoughtless.

III

Now return to the subject of sport. "What moral judgment," asks Dean Inge in a recent speech, "ought to be passed on hunting, fishing, coursing, pigeon shooting, big game shooting, pheasant or partridge shooting?" "I will not," he continues, "attempt to answer any of these questions. What is important is that we should admit that they are moral questions,

which must not be put aside as having nothing to do with the good life."*

Our problem here is to distinguish culpable cruelty to animals from "legitimate sport," if any legitimate sport is to be admitted. There is, I think, a very clear distinction between taking pleasure in the infliction of pain as such—a morbid pleasure which we shall all condemn—and taking pleasure in the pursuit of animals, where some amount of suffering (which we seek to diminish as much as possible) is incidental to the pursuit.

I imagine that we all admit that, for the evident good of mankind, some pain and some privation may be lawfully inflicted on the lower animals. If this were not admitted we should have to condemn, what we all of us practise, the use of animals as food. Those who have scruples on this point are, I think, a negligible minority.

The defender of sport must, on the other hand, admit that his amusement entails some suffering—in some cases considerable suffering—to the animals he hunts or shoots. The sufferings of the hunted animal are often grossly exaggerated in partisan arguments. It is unreasonable to "read in" to the feelings of the fox all that a human being would feel if he were in the fox's place. Yet, in the last few minutes of the run, it is quite evident that the animal must have an unpleasant time; and this is a fact we have no right to ignore, though, if on general grounds we come to the conclusion that the sport is lawful, there is no reason why we should dwell on these sufferings morbidly. To judge by every analogy, the death as commonly inflicted in cold blood in the slaughter-house, or in the slaughter of poultry, must far outweigh in matter of suffering the death inflicted in the open field; but in the latter case, too, the suffering is real.

The question, then, is: Is there any positive benefit to mankind which justifies the suffering thus entailed?

To reach an agreed answer to this question we must first, I suppose, agree in our judgment of the "sporting instinct" itself—the "sporting instinct" understood in the sense in which the words are commonly used to describe the natural passion for the pursuit and killing of the lower animals. There are those who condemn it as wholly evil; but these surely are the men who, not knowing it intimately in themselves, confuse it with the cold-blooded cruelty of which I have spoken, which rejoices in the infliction of pain as such. No sportsman—and no one who has had intimate acquaintance with sportsmen—can, I think, honestly persist in this confusion when his attention has once been called to the obvious difference between these

* *Modern Churchman*, August, 1930, p. 267.

two frames of mind. It is not an accident that love for and sympathy with animals exists generally in a marked degree among those who also love sport. A well-known poet, defending the warrior, said: "I need not love my brother any the less because it falls to me to inflict on him the death-blow." The Franciscan love of animals is a very charming thing, but the nearest thing to it that we can commonly witness is to be found among those who have been sportsmen all their lives.

It will be fairly asked—even by those who distinguish the sporting instinct from those morbid passions to which psychologists give unpleasant names—whether we can defend the sporting instinct as not merely natural but good. I have myself no hesitation on this point. There are passions and instincts which, though in some of their manifestations evil, are in moderation necessary to the completeness of normal human nature. Such is the sexual instinct. The complete absence of this instinct—though it may go with much that is noble—is in itself a defect. There is, I feel, something similarly defective in the human being—at least, in the male human being—who wholly lacks, who fails utterly to comprehend, this other natural instinct of which we are speaking. The man who is frigid in either of these respects (sex or sport) often has a compensating delicacy which is good. He has, as we say, the "qualities of his defects." It may none the less be true that the frigidity itself is evil.

Further, if we have once recognized the goodness of this natural instinct, we need, in order to strike the balance fairly between the animal pain we inflict and the benefit to man which results from its infliction, to recognize both the strength and the distinctness of this instinct. There are those with whom, at least in youth, it rises to the intensity of one of the major passions. We are often warned of the evil effects of the undue repression of our natural instincts. The warning is no less necessary in this case than in others. Again, those who, in a familiar phrase, suggest that this instinct should be "sublimated"—i.e., that the energy it employs should be turned into a different channel—are ignoring its strongly individual character. The comparison between the sportsman's pursuit of an animal and the philosopher's pursuit of truth is, as a comparison, apt. It has its place in great literature. The philosopher's pursuit is incomparably the nobler. But if anyone argues that the pursuit of philosophical, historical, or physical truth should, without more ado, take the place of this animal instinct, he is speaking without comprehension. It has been said of the saints who devoted themselves to a life of contemplation that they lived to show how much God might

be to those who determined to have Him only. The love of the saint for God is nobler than the love of a Romeo for a Juliet. There are those who, in some clear case of conflict, have surrendered an earthly love for a heavenly. But it would show mere unintelligence if we spoke as if this involved no sacrifice, as if nothing that was good had been surrendered, as if in the sacrifice we were merely giving up the worse for something palpably better. I should suspect of hypocrisy the man who in such a case said simply: "Sublimate your earthly love; the heavenly love will fulfil everything you want; you will have lost nothing." He ought to recognize the greatness of the sacrifice. Similarly, in thinking today of this much humbler thing than the passion which has been the main theme of the dramatists—this instinct which impels us to the pursuit and killing of animals—I resent bitterly the advice that this instinct should be simply replaced by something else. I do not accuse those who give this advice of hypocrisy, but merely of not understanding the character of the impulse of which they speak.

My own opinion, then, is that if we take into account both the strength and the distinctive character of this impulse, and at the same time regard it as not merely natural but good, so that its violent repression is an evil, we shall refuse to condemn the infliction on animals of such suffering as the gratification of this impulse involves. If we reflect upon the far greater number of human beings who may gain health and healthy pleasure from the killing, say, of one fox than can gain it from the death, which we almost all approve, of one chicken or turkey, I think we can hardly fail to see towards which side the balance of good against evil inclines. Moreover, if the charge is that we increase animal pain, it must in fairness be admitted that the sportsman also increases animal pleasure. Many a species would, but for sport, become extinct in a generation; be put permanently beyond the reach both of pleasure and of pain.

I am confirmed in this personal opinion by discussion with two very eminent theologians, neither of them sportsmen, but both of them men who have given much systematic thought to moral questions. One of them based his judgment on the grounds I have mentioned. He thinks that the good gained by human beings outweighs the admitted suffering of the animals. The other raised a new point. He said that he found it easier on general principles to defend the killing of animals for the purposes of sport than the killing of animals for food, though he was prepared also without hesitation to defend the latter. I imagine that what he meant was that the fattening of animals for the market develops wholly the lowest, the most

animal side of their nature, whereas in the hunted animal his higher side, what Plato calls τὸ θυμοειδές, is brought into play: his strength, tenacity, endurance, even his pugnacity and courage. He also expressed agreement with the opinion that, if we feel it our duty to do all we can to abolish war, this is an added reason why we should work for the conservation of sport. Sport gives play to impulses in our nature which have found their opportunity in warfare, which, in an entirely peaceful world—which none the less it is our duty to seek—must “fester in us unused,”* except so far as they find in sport the outlet denied to them elsewhere.

I have given these reminiscences of private discussions because they serve to correct a mistake which is commonly made. I am sure that many people, especially in the Free Churches, imagine that the Anglican clergy are mostly silent on this subject, and support sport by this silence, partly from *cowardice*—i.e., because they do not wish to come into conflict with influential persons who are sportsmen. Or they think that we are blinded to the unlawfulness of what seems to them unjustifiable, and even disgusting, cruelty, by the special circumstance that we have been familiar with such sport since our childhood.

I think that the Anglican clergy have indeed shown cowardice, or at least blindness, in not condemning a life of mere amusement and idleness. St. Paul's remark that if a man will not work, neither should he eat, was not confined by him to those who need to work for their living. But, none the less, it is just that it should be known that those of us who refuse to condemn sport, or who even actively promote it, are by no means unaware of the stern injunctions of the Christian Gospel. We may still quite consistently hold that great harm is done by the rigoristic temper in all its manifestations. We may still rightly protest against needless prohibition, against the condemnation of what we believe to be in the sight of God innocent.

To sum up: the charges against sport are, first, that it adds to the sum of animal pain; and, secondly, that it proceeds from an evil frame of mind. In regard to the former charge, it is not difficult to show that, on balance, the species which are hunted and shot gain far more than they lose. So long, for example, as fox-hunting lasts, the fox will find friends to pay his poultry bill. Can it be reasonably expected that the community will feel justified, when he is no longer hunted, in preserving and protecting him—except, perhaps, in a few small reserved areas—on grounds of mere kind-heartedness or zoological interest?

* *Hamlet*, Act IV., Scene 4.

With regard to the second charge, it is chiefly needful to call attention to a mere matter of fact: the very clear distinction between the frame of mind of the ordinary sportsman and that of the torturer (surely among grown-up people a very rare case) who gloats morbidly over the sufferings of his victim. The suffering of the hunted animal enters, as such, no more into the sportsman's pleasure than the greater horrors of the slaughter-house enter into the enjoyment of the man who eats beef at table. It is true that, among those who know quite well that the sportsman is no "sadist," there are some who none the less feel a personal shrinking from all sport. The delicacy which finds sport barbarous is no more wholly evil than is the delicacy which in all ages has found the sexual life coarse. Such delicacy reveals one aspect of the truth. There is an element of coarseness, as Schopenhauer saw, in some aspects of human nature. It is mere blindness not to recognize this coarseness for what it is. It is an equal blindness not to see that in the composition of human nature as a whole these coarser elements have a worthy and a necessary place. In the case of sexual passion this is generally recognized. Now if it were merely admitted that the principle applicable to sex may conceivably be applicable to the sportsman's passion too, the admission, even if it went no further, would check some of those denunciations of sport which, till they are thought out, sound rhetorically impressive: "Here is something coarse and violent. Can it possibly be consistent with Christian discipleship?" I ask you to think out for yourselves* the suggested analogy between the sporting and the sexual instincts. I ask you, further, to think of our Saviour's condemnation of those who lay on others heavy burdens which they do not themselves touch with one of their fingers; and to think out the bearing of this rebuke upon every case in which men are inclined to impose on others prohibitions by which they will not be affected themselves.

C. J. SHEBBEARE.

RECENT LIGHT ON THE FLOOD

THE story of the Great Flood is for most of us a cherished possession of childhood days and a source of intermittent puzzlement in later life. As children it has lived for us through

* *Of Christianity and the Conquest of the Air* in a forthcoming number of the *Modern Churchman*.

the medium of the pasteboard figures of the Noah's Ark. And it has just that combination of vastness with naïveté which can still appeal to something primitive beneath the sophistication of the modern mind. Add to this that its source is a book which, alike for the modernist and for adherents of the older piety, bears unique emotional associations, and it is little wonder that there are few people who would not be interested to learn "how much there is in it." The steps by which this age-long question has been answered only in the last few years form one of the most fascinating romances of archaeological research.

The study of comparative folklore has shown that a "Flood-story" is a very widespread feature in the folk-tales of the different branches of the human race. And until the more recent discoveries, this fact seemed to many people, who for religious reasons were desirous of seeing the biblical narrative vindicated, to give ground for the belief that a universal deluge did occur at some time in the distant past. But these stories are of unequal value and irregular distribution. Those who are interested will find the fullest and most reliable collection in Sir James Frazer's *Folklore in the Old Testament*. He concludes that while stories of a Great Flood are common throughout the continent of Asia, the islands of the Pacific, and North and South America, they are rare in European mythology, and still rarer in Africa. Moreover, they belong to three distinct classes: (1) Those derived from the biblical account, which has in Christian times been very widely disseminated by the missionaries. (2) *Myths*, which have grown up as explanations of certain local geographical peculiarities. Such, for instance, is the Greek Deucalion myth, invented to account for the dried lake-bed of the Plain of Thessaly. (3) *Legends*, which have in the course of time become overlaid with mythological or imaginary features, but which go back to some local catastrophe which at the time profoundly impressed the minds of the people affected. To this class Frazer assigned the Hebrew and Babylonian Flood-stories.

The Hebrew story (Gen. vi. 5 to ix. 17) is compiled from two sources of widely different date. The earlier, or Jahvistic Document was written after the division into two kingdoms on the death of Solomon, and before either Israel or Judah had been led captive into Babylon. Frazer points out that the incident of Noah's sacrifice to Jehovah is related with no hint that this was anything unusual or irregular, despite the fact that he was a layman. And from this it seems a reasonable inference that its composition was prior to the decree of Josiah in 621 B.C., strictly prohibiting sacrifice outside Jerusalem and by others

than the members of the hereditary priesthood. Its date can therefore be fixed with little likelihood of error between 900 and 700 B.C. The second component, known as the Priestly Code, dates from the Captivity in Babylon. It is distinguished by the use of *Elohim* instead of the *Jahveh* of the earlier document. In the importance it assigns to the ritualistic aspects of the event, the absurdly meticulous instructions for the making of the Ark, the elaborate genealogies, etc., it exhibits the preoccupations of the priestly class at that time with formalistic detail and the minutiae of ceremonial. In a few minor respects the two accounts contradict each other—*e.g.*, the duration of the Flood, and the distinction between clean and unclean animals; but in the main they are complementary. The earlier document is simple, straightforward, and poetical in conception; the later incorporation supplies detail corresponding to a particular interest.

We have long known of the existence of a Babylonian Flood-story. The earliest existing record of it is in Eusebius, an historian of the Early Church (c. A.D. 325). He is known to have copied from the writings of Julius Africanus, who probably derived his account, through Alexander Polyhistor (first century B.C.), from a certain Berosus, who composed a history of Babylon in Greek, about 300 B.C. The Babylonian and Hebrew stories were early seen to stand apart from the mass of Flood-stories in primitive folklore. They have too much agreement, both in detail and in general structure, to be independent growths. Either they must be legends going back to the same original catastrophe, or, if they are purely mythological, one must be an offshoot from the other. The detailed similarities of the portions of the Genesis story which are due to the Priestly Code with the Babylonian account would, of course, by themselves present no difficulty. For that document was written in Babylon and under Babylonian influences. But the same is not true of the earlier portions of the narrative. And it is inconceivable that two stories showing such intimate agreement could have developed independently in countries so far apart. Nor were the relations between the countries at that date such as to render the theory of literary borrowing at all likely. And so, until a generation ago, it was generally supposed that the Babylonian story, retailed by Berosus in his history, was borrowed from the Hebrews during their captivity, and incorporated into Babylonian mythology. The discoveries by which this supposition has been overthrown, and the enormously greater antiquity of the Babylonian account vindicated, read more like a novel of detection than a history of investigation.

It began in 1845 when Layard started excavations in the mound of Kouyunjik, near the town of Mosul, which contains part of the remains of Nineveh, the ancient capital of Assyria. Here he found the ruins of two royal palaces, one built by Sennacherib (705-681 B.C.), and the other by Assur-bani-pal (668-626 B.C.). In the latter were unearthed an enormous number of fragments of clay tablets covered with inscriptions (estimated at about 20,000). They were obviously the remains of a library formed by Assur-bani-pal, and housed in an upper chamber of the palace, which had fallen in and deposited its contents. This treasure was presented by Layard to the British Museum, and the authorities immediately undertook the task of deciphering them, enlisting for this purpose the aid of the leading Assyriologists of the day. At that time the science of photography was in its infancy, and its use for the manufacture of reproductions was almost unknown. The trustees therefore hired a draughtsman, Mr. George Smith, to make copies of those tablets which were to be studied by foreign scholars.

But George Smith, although employed merely as a copyist, conceived the ambition of learning to read the inscriptions which it was his duty to reproduce. His wonderful energy enabled him to master the cuneiform script and the—at that time—little-known Assyrian language. Being thus able to read the inscriptions, in the course of his work of classifying he came across a fragment which seemed to relate to a story of a Flood. Realizing the significance of his discovery, he immediately started to search for other fragments, and eventually was able to piece together, although with many gaps, the outlines of the story. In addition, he found fragments from two other accounts of the Flood. In this way there came to light a Flood-story identical with the Hebrew account in many of its smallest details, and dating at the least from the seventh century B.C. It was, moreover, seen to be one of twelve episodes in a larger epic, dealing with the adventures of a hero or King Gilgamish, of considerably greater antiquity. This discovery alone was sufficient to revolutionize the then accepted theory of the relations of the Hebrew and Babylonian Flood-stories.

George Smith published his discovery at a meeting of the Society of Biblical Archæology on December 3, 1872. Considerable interest was at once displayed both among scholars and the ordinary public. By the generosity of the proprietors of the *Daily Telegraph*, Smith was enabled to go out to Assyria to search for further tablets of the Gilgamish epic. And on this and two subsequent expeditions he succeeded in making material additions to the collection. He succumbed in 1876

to an illness due in part to his excessive labours in the prosecution of his research.

Since this time great strides have been made in the knowledge of the Assyrian and Babylonian languages, and with the help of dictionaries contained in the library of Assur-bani-pal scholars can decipher an earlier language, the Sumerian, which was spoken by the people who possessed the land before the influx of the Semitic races. The store of tablets has also been enriched by discoveries at Boghaz Keui and other sites in Asia Minor. These subsequent discoveries have put beyond doubt the extreme antiquity of the Gilgamish epic, including the account of the Flood. We have fragments of an account written in Sumerian which is certainly earlier than 2000 B.C. And certain pictorial representations of incidents from the tale, engraved on seals, go back to 3000 B.C. But the series from Kouyunjik, compiled for the Royal Library of Nineveh by Sin-liqi-unnini, still remains the main text. The Gilgamish epic is now accessible to the public in several translations.

The next great step forward in the acquisition of evidence was the discovery of tablets professing to give a complete list of the kings who ruled in the cities of Mesopotamia before and after the Flood. The one list was found at Nippur, a sacred city of the Sumerians, and was written in 2141 B.C. This is the earliest known written record of the Flood. The other, from Larsa, was written about forty-two years later. It was discovered by Mr. Weld-Blundell. When these lists are compared together, and with that given by Berosus, they show general agreement while differing in certain places. But their authenticity has been placed beyond doubt by the results of excavations in Ur and Kish. In particular, Mr. Woolley came upon the foundation inscription of a temple at Ur, on which appeared the name of Mes-an-ni-pad-da, who is given in the lists as the founder of the first dynasty of that city after the Flood. Gilgamish, the hero of the epic whose discovery by George Smith was the stimulus for subsequent research, appears in the lists as the fifth king in the first dynasty of Erech. It is impossible here to embark upon a detailed account of the discoveries at Ur—they have indeed received a full measure of publicity. In so far as concerns our subject they bear out the main lines of the interpretation of the evidence already indicated.

Thus at the beginning of 1929 a variety of evidence had come to hand from different sources, but fitting together to indicate one conclusion—viz., that the Flood-story was a *legend* referring to an inundation which occurred in Mesopotamia before the first dynasty to rule in Kish; that there were dynasties

ruling in several of the Mesopotamian towns before the Deluge; and that it was catastrophic in its effects, and left a vivid impression upon the minds of the survivors. The great national epic of Gilgamish, King of Erech, about 4000 B.C., after many exploits of the usual heroic character, relates how he set out in search of a means of acquiring eternal life. In the course of his wanderings he meets an ancient hero, Uta-Napishtim, who tells him the story of his escape from the Great Flood, and how he had subsequently received the gift of eternal life from the gods. The royal lists give Gilgamish as the fifth king in the first dynasty at Erech after the Flood. And the name of the last ruler before the Flood is Ubardudu or Ziusuddu, King of Shuruppak—obviously the same as Xisuthros, who in the account of Berosus is the survivor corresponding to the biblical Noah. These lists had been proved by the discovery of inscriptions, tombs, etc., to be based upon historical fact, and not to be purely imaginary. Lastly, a fine painted pottery ware had been found in large quantities at the first settlement at Susa, at Tell al-'Ubaid, and at many other sites, which there was good reason for attributing to the antediluvian inhabitants of the land. But as yet no direct traces of the Flood had been found. This last and most convincing link in the chain has been forged by evidence coming from two independent sources during the past year.*

In a letter to *The Times* on March 16, 1929, Mr. Leonard Woolley announced a discovery which he took to be direct evidence of the Flood. Digging through a heap of stratified rubbish below the pit-graves which he had already unearthed at Ur, he came upon a layer of eight feet of solid and unstratified river-laid clay in which were no signs of human habitation. Below this he found further signs of occupation corresponding to that which had already been elsewhere tentatively assigned to the antediluvian race. Two days later Professor Langdon communicated to *The Times* the discovery at Kish of similar direct traces of a Flood. The evidence at the two sites has not yet been correlated by scholars with complete certainty. There are, for instance, at Kish three layers of mud of various depths, indicating three distinct inundations. The most convincing reconstruction on the available data will be found in Mr. Harold Peake's book entitled *The Flood*. If, as is probable, the lowest and thickest layer at Kish and the layer discovered by Woolley at Ur were deposited in the same inundation, this must be the Great Flood to which our stories refer. And its date would be about 4250 or 4200 B.C. There is reason to believe that the Sumerians had at that time already entered

* This article was written in MS. in the spring of 1930.

Mesopotamia from the shores of the Persian Gulf. The older inhabitants lived in reed huts on the low land by the banks of the river. They would succumb in the Flood. But the Sumerians had already begun to build walled cities on slightly higher ground, and these probably proved their salvation. Woolley has conjectured that Xisuthros, Uta-Napishtim, or Noah, the headman of the settlement at Shuruppak, and belonging to the pre-Sumerian race, was warned by a friendly Sumerian of the advent of the Flood, and enabled to escape with his family on a raft the fate of the majority of his countrymen.

It is evident, then, and indisputable that the Babylonian Flood-story is immeasurably older than that of the Hebrews. But the strange similarity between the two remains. And it can only be explained on the assumption that the Hebrew story was borrowed from the Babylonian. Our increased knowledge of the early history of the Hebrew race enables us to indicate how such borrowing would be likely to have occurred. The Hebrews, originally a tribe living near Bir-Hafar, a small town in the Wadi Armah, settled at an early date at Ur, which was an important trading centre. On the defeat of Rim-Sin, King of Larsa, with whom they had joined forces, by Hammurabi, and the destruction of Ur in 2015 B.C., they left Ur under the leadership of Abram to escape the vengeance of the Babylonian monarch. It was during their sojourn at Ur that the Hebrews must have learnt the Babylonian Flood-story (which we know to have been current there at that date), and incorporated it in their own folk-mythology. Its appearance so much later in writing is in accord with all we know of the persistent vitality of folk-tales.

The present generation is working towards a new and sounder attitude to the "historical" portions of the Old Testament. Its endeavour is to pin its faith upon common-sense submission to evidence in preference to preconceived theory of any sort. But, like all mediating views, this position presents a peculiar difficulty to the ordinary populace, unable as it is to keep up with the rapid growth of knowledge, and often without the necessary background fully to appreciate the significance of those items of information which it acquires through the medium of the press. It is perhaps still true that the majority of people have been brought up to believe, with more or less strictness, in the literal accuracy of the Bible. But few find themselves now able to accept the full implications of such a belief—able, for instance, to accredit a universal deluge in which all life, except the inhabitants of the Ark, was destroyed. On the other hand, a shrewd right-headedness prevents most people from going over to the "Mythological" school, and

denying *in toto* any basis in historical fact to the Old Testament stories. The opinions of the greater number of people are in a fluid state, and there is considerable eagerness to learn where the truth lies. It is entirely in the interests both of religion and truth that the fullest publicity should be given to definite knowledge, in so far as it has been attained. The history of the gradual dovetailing of information and discovery of facts long buried from the ken of mankind, culminating in the verification of an event which occurred more than 6,000 years before our time, is in itself of engrossing interest. Its importance as illustrating a principle of biblical interpretation is still greater. It is no longer possible or desirable to accept the literal accuracy of these old biblical tales. But it is equally unscientific to infer that they are mythical or purely imaginary. Rather, they are *legendary*, going back to actual and historical occurrences, but overlaid with imaginary and picturesque details. The business of criticism is to unearth the historical core that lies hidden within them.

H. OSBORNE.

ST PAUL'S MINISTRY AT EPHESUS: A RECONSTRUCTION

It is the traditional belief of the Church that the Imprisonment Epistles of St. Paul were written while he awaited his trial at Rome. That the belief is not without its difficulties is evidenced by the rise of a rival hypothesis (which in itself has little to commend it) that the Epistles date from the Cæsarean imprisonment. During the last thirty years, however, the view has been steadily gaining ground (it was first put forward by Deissmann, and has since received support from many scholars, including Feine, Goguel, Bacon, and Lake) that Paul must have been imprisoned at least once, perhaps oftener, during his three-years ministry in Ephesus and neighbourhood, and that to this period some, if not all, of the Imprisonment Epistles are to be ascribed. In my recent book, *St. Paul's Ephesian Ministry* (Hodder and Stoughton), I have sought to present a case for this hypothesis, and to use it as a basis for a reconstruction of this central period in St. Paul's missionary activity.

THE QUESTION OF AN EPHESIAN IMPRISONMENT

The account in Acts of St. Paul's work at Ephesus and neighbourhood is sadly meagre, though some claim to intimacy belongs to the section beginning at xix. 21. At the end of the

period there was a violent outbreak of Gentile opposition, at the instigation of a silversmith called Demetrius. What meantime were orthodox Jews thinking of this new movement which, as we are told, was winning adherents, both Jewish and Gentile, throughout the whole province? It was Jews from Asia, we read (Acts xxi. 27), who shortly after this time assailed the apostle when he appeared in the Temple at Jerusalem. He himself in his address to the Ephesian elders alludes to the sorrows and trials he experienced in Asia as a result of Jewish plots (Acts xx. 19). As further indicating the troubles of that period, we cannot forget that ominous allusion to fighting with wild beasts at Ephesus (1 Cor. xv. 32), or the language used in the opening verses of 2 Corinthians to describe a terrible experience which took place somewhere in Asia, when the apostle recognized that his last hour had come—he was as good as dead when God intervened to deliver him (2 Cor. i. 8 ff.).

If we look next for evidence that this hostility issued in imprisonment, we may recall the "boast" in 2 Cor. xi. 23 (written shortly after he left Ephesus), which, with the reference to "fellow-prisoners" in Rom. xvi. 7, indicates that about this time the apostle suffered perhaps frequent imprisonments about which Acts has nothing to say. To this day there lingers on at Ephesus a tradition regarding St. Paul's prison-house. And if we turn to the so-called Monarchian Prologues to St. Paul's Epistles we read, with reference to Colossians: "*apostulus iam ligatus scribit eis ab Epheso*"—a piece of evidence whose importance is not seriously diminished by the fact that the Prologues to the other Epistles of the group refer to Rome; this merely means that in the latter case the Prologues echo the general tradition, and do so uncritically (witness the failure to recognize that Philemon and Colossians must go together), whereas behind the reference to Ephesus there would appear to lie a tradition of independent value.

THE EPHESIAN ORIGIN OF THE IMPRISONMENT EPISTLES

The real strength of the Ephesian hypothesis is revealed when we come to study the settings of the various Imprisonment Epistles. Take Philemon—and with it goes Colossians, also (if it is authentic) Ephesians. Once the possibility of Ephesus looms before us, is it not in every way more probable that it was to the great neighbouring city, rather than to Rome (from which he was separated by two sea journeys and 1,000 miles of dangerous road), that the defaulting Onesimus ran for safety, and that it was from there (before his advance to the West began), rather than from the distant Imperial city (at a time when his

gaze was turned rather towards Spain), that St. Paul wrote with a request about a lodging? Or take Philippians. The Philippians are encouraged (ii. 19-24) to look forward to a visit from Timothy, followed, if all goes well, by one from the apostle himself; and with this agrees admirably what we know regarding St. Paul's plans for himself and his deputy when he was in Ephesus (Acts xix. 21, 22; 1 Cor. iv. 17, 19; xvi. 5, 10). Further, the various journeys, accomplished or in prospect, to which reference is made in Philippians, are difficult to explain if the apostle is at this time so far away as Rome; while the language in which he acknowledges the liberality of the Philippians is in every way more intelligible if the gift was sent to Ephesus (at a comparatively short interval after their previous gift), rather than after a ten or twelve years' interval to Rome. We may add that the references to the *prætorium* and to Cæsar's household present no difficulty, for the *prætorium* was the residence of the provincial governor, while under the term "*familia Cæsaris*" were grouped those freedmen and slaves who in the various parts of the Empire looked after the revenues which were destined for the Emperor's privy purse. Lastly, in support of the Ephesian imprisonment, we may well question if it is probable that Aristarchus, Demas, Epaphras, Epaphroditus, Jesus Justus, Luke, Mark, Onesimus, Timothy, Titus, most of whom we know to have had associations with Asia, came to follow the apostle to Rome.

WAS THERE MORE THAN ONE CRISIS IN ASIA?

[Such are some of the main arguments generally urged in support of the Ephesian hypothesis, and, taken in conjunction with others, I believe they provide a good case for assigning all the Imprisonment Epistles to the Ephesian period. In my book, however, I have carried the enquiry a stage further by seeking to work out in some detail a reconstruction of events during the whole period, so that each of the Epistles may be seen in its true setting. This proved a task almost baffling in its intricacy; and if the reconstruction at which I have arrived seem at first sight too involved, I can only plead that the data themselves are too involved to make a simpler solution admissible. For example, St. Paul's reference in 1 Corinthians to the possibility of his fighting with beasts clearly points back to a crisis anterior to the writing of that Epistle; whereas the "distress" of which he informs his readers in 2 Cor. i. 8 ff. is apparently quite recent—not merely later than 1 Corinthians, but later even than the sorrowful visit. From a consideration of the various references in Philippians, 1 Corinthians, and

Acts to the prospective visits of Timothy and of the apostle to Macedonia and to Achaia, it would appear as if Philippians (written before Timothy's departure) is anterior to the Demetrius riot, anterior also to 1 Corinthians (written probably after Timothy's departure; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 17, and the absence of Timothy's name from the salutation in 1 Cor. i. 1). There is thus good reason for thinking that the danger of the arena hinted at in 1 Cor. xv. 32 may be linked up with the crisis which immediately preceded the writing of Philippians, and which led the apostle to write there as one whose life had been threatened. On the other hand, a study of the references to Aristarchus, Demas, Luke, Aquila, and Priscilla makes it practically certain that Colossians and Philemon do not fall into the same imprisonment as Philippians; they are possibly to be assigned to a later period of mild detention (cf. the prayer in Col. iv. 3, Eph. vi. 19, for liberty to proclaim the mystery of the Gospel; there is no hint in these letters of imminent danger) following on the Demetrius riot. Thus we are led to postulate two imprisonments at Ephesus, the first (during which Philippians was written) being much more serious than the second (when he wrote Colossians, Philemon, and the circular letter to the Churches in Asia which we call Ephesians); while a third crisis of great intensity supervened on his return to Asia after the sorrowful visit to Corinth.

ST. PAUL'S MOVEMENTS FROM EPHEBUS AS A BASE

At this point we turn to a wider field for clues to help us in our reconstruction. The sorrowful visit to Corinth, which of course is later than 1 Corinthians, seems to my mind to be taken most naturally in close conjunction with the tour outlined in 1 Cor. xvi. 5; only, as it happened, it did not come about normally at the conclusion of that tour, but was an interruption which a sinister turn of events forced on the apostle at some point *en route*. And here we may note that if the interruption came at Troas, we can imagine the apostle leaving behind him his heavy cloak (2 Tim. iv. 13), which, as the time was summer (cf. "until Pentecost," 1 Cor. xvi. 8, and "before winter," 2 Tim. iv. 21), he meant to pick up on his return.

This leads us on to a fuller consideration of the evidence of the Pastoral Epistles. Whatever view we may take regarding these letters as a whole, there can be no doubt that in certain sections of them, notably where we have personal references, there are preserved genuine notes from the pen of the apostle; and, despite the reference to Rome in 2 Tim. i. 17,

I believe that all of them are to be assigned to the period immediately following the apostle's departure from Ephesus (cf. 1 Tim. i. 3). Of these notes, the most important for our enquiry is found in 2 Tim. iv. Here a careful examination of detail makes it plain that the "first defence" (verse 16), of which apparently Timothy now hears for the first time, cannot be taken in conjunction with the first Ephesian crisis or with the period of *parole* following on the Demetrius riot. On the other hand, a good case can be made out for connecting it with the critical experience in Asia (2 Cor. i. 8 ff.), which came after the sorrowful visit to Corinth, and in corroboration of this we may note how closely akin the two narratives are in their expression of the gravity of the danger and the supernatural character of the deliverance; cf., too, the assurance of future deliverance with which both passages close. We may add that our interpretation of the cloak incident demands for 2 Tim. iv. a date subsequent to the sorrowful visit, and this is confirmed by the references here and in Colossians to Demas, Tychicus, and others.

Collecting our data we are thus enabled to picture St. Paul, at the conclusion of his mission-work in Asia, setting out after Pentecost to go to Macedonia. In addition to Trophimus and Luke he has with him Demas and possibly Aristarchus, two Thessalonians who had joined his staff at Ephesus as missionary representatives from their local congregation, just as at a slightly earlier date Epaphroditus had come from Philippi; they had both been with him in Ephesus when he wrote Colossians and Philemon, and now that he is advancing to Macedonia they naturally go with him. At Troas news of disaffection at Corinth (brought, I believe, by Titus) impels the apostle to alter his plans and to go at once to Corinth. Demas prefers to go home to Thessalonica, and even deserts the cause. Forced to postpone his plans for evangelizing Macedonia (1 Cor. xvi. 5), St. Paul sends Titus along the *via Egnatia* to Dalmatia, while he himself goes on to Corinth. His visit there is a failure, and he returns to Asia—not, however, to Troas, for 2 Tim. iv. 20 refers to Miletus, where, owing to illness, Trophimus is left behind. Was it merely the necessities of boat connections, or bad news from the Lycus valley, that compelled the apostle to take this route? Thus we are led to locate the crisis of 2 Tim. iv. somewhere in the heart of the province of Asia (Timothy is meantime in Ephesus); and it is interesting to find corroboration for this in the fact that Codex A and the Coptic versions associate 1 and 2 Timothy with Laodicea.

During this winter St. Paul wrote his sorrowful letter to Corinth, and Titus (who on his master's forced retiral had come

south from Dalmatia to Corinth) soon joined him with reassuring news in Macedonia. While Titus returns to Corinth as the bearer of 2 Corinthians, St. Paul advances through Macedonia to Illyricum (Rom. xv. 19), encouraged no doubt by the exploratory work which Titus had done in the previous autumn; and it is to this period that we assign the note he addressed to Titus (iii. 12), inviting him to join him at Nicopolis. Early in the following year St. Paul arrived at Corinth (Acts xx. 2).

THE CHARGE OF TEMPLE ROBBERY

Space forbids the discussion here of two problems which I have examined at some length in my book—viz., the collection for the saints and the development of Jewish opposition. A word must be said, however, regarding the question on what grounds St. Paul was so bitterly attacked in Ephesus that, as indicated in Philippians and 1 Corinthians, his very life was threatened. Here a clue presents itself in the account in Acts of the Demetrius riot. The town clerk, be it noted, and the Asiarchs are represented as well disposed to the apostle—a fact which need not surprise us if, as we have urged, there had been a *previous* outburst of hostility against the apostle when the Jews had brought against him a desperate charge, on which, however, he had been acquitted. And when the town clerk, in seeking to control the mob, declares that the missionaries are neither Temple robbers nor blasphemers of the goddess, does not his specific reference to Temple robbery indicate that this crime had indeed been urged against them? Also his confident refutation would be easy to understand if the authorities had on a previous occasion examined the charge and discovered it to be without foundation. To understand this accusation, which I believe was urged by Jews, we may recall how all adult Jews, even in the Dispersion, were required to pay an annual tax for the upkeep of the Temple at Jerusalem; and we have various Imperial edicts (in particular we have some addressed to the magistrates, senate, and people of Ephesus) guaranteeing the right of the Jews to make and transmit this collection. And when the Jews of Asia saw how this fund of theirs was adversely affected by the rapid expansion of the Christian movement and by the encouragement given to the converts to contribute to specifically Christian schemes, can it be that, in their desperate and unscrupulous efforts to accomplish the apostle's destruction, they attacked him for his alleged criminal attitude to the Temple, as on other occasions they did for his attitude to the Law? If they did, this was a charge which no Roman governor, in view especially of the Imperial edicts above

referred to, could treat otherwise than with the utmost seriousness; and we can understand how for a time there was real danger that the apostle might pay the penalty with his life. In the end, however, Roman justice triumphed over Jewish intolerance, and he was acquitted.

THE SILENCE OF ACTS

In conclusion we must ask why it is that on a matter of such interest and importance the book of Acts has nothing to say; and here we come to a question which, unless some attempt is made to answer it, will always raise a serious doubt regarding the truth of the Ephesian hypothesis. In approaching this matter it is fair to recall that Luke himself was apparently not in Ephesus at this time, though I believe that he joined the apostle there shortly afterwards, for he writes with knowledge regarding the Demetrius riot and his name appears in the list of greetings in Colossians and Philemon. But clearly a more adequate answer ought to be sought for.

Now with regard to the general question of the book of Acts, I am one of those who, with Harnack, Torrey, and others, recognize that there is a strong case for assigning its composition to the period of St. Paul's imprisonment in Rome; and thus there opens up before us the further possibility that one purpose it was designed to serve was to supply the Roman authorities with facts regarding the Christian movement, so that, despite Jewish calumnies, it might receive from Rome recognition alongside of Judaism as a *religio licita*. (Some use may be made of this hypothesis even if it is preferred to assign Acts in its present form to a later date.) In this connection it was a great matter that the author was able to appeal to the toleration or even sympathy shown by Roman officials in the provinces, and Gallio's brother Seneca, we may recall, might, as Nero's chief minister, have an important voice in the ultimate decision. All the more surprising is it that nothing is said regarding the events in Ephesus, and of the part which the proconsul of Asia played in securing St. Paul's deliverance.

I believe a reason for this silence may be found in Tacitus (*Annals*, XIII. i.). There we read that the first victim of Nero's reign was Junius Silanus, proconsul of Asia, whom Agrippina ordered to be poisoned as a dangerous rival to her son for the principate. The date of this is A.D. 54, the year to which on other grounds we may assign the first Ephesian crisis. And apart from the proconsul himself, one member of his family after another was driven to suicide or to exile. Have we not perhaps here a reason why Luke, in preparing a statement which

might ultimately reach Nero and his friends, regarded it as politic to say nothing about the proconsul at Ephesus?

If the general thesis here put forward is correct, it means that we have no Epistles dating from St. Paul's Roman imprisonment. This is a result which in itself we cannot but regret. But it is not loss, but gain, if the letters which were used to shed a false light about the closing days of the apostle are now seen to light up for us those central years in his missionary activity when the battle for the faith was at its fiercest.

G. S. DUNCAN.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AND THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

AN ESTIMATE OF DR. TENNANT'S EMPIRICAL THEISM

In the two volumes of his *Philosophical Theology* Dr. F. R. Tennant supplies a most valuable introduction to the study of Christian theism. The value of the book will be found to lie not merely in the extensive knowledge which it draws upon from the fields of science, psychology, and metaphysics, but rather in the spirit in which the whole enquiry is carried through. Dr. Tennant is aware that "a large proportion of defects that we are wont to account intellectual are at bottom moral" (i. 293). He is, therefore, a scrupulously conscientious investigator, and his work is an example of the way in which a philosophical theologian ought to think, if his contribution is to be anything more than an apology for dogmatic theology.

The method adopted by philosophical theology must be the scientific method of trying to discover what in point of fact is true, and not the apologetic method of trying to prove what we have previously decided ought to be true. This is one important difference between empiricism and rationalism. Perhaps Dr. Tennant draws too sharp a distinction between these two types of philosophy and speaks with undue harshness in denouncing rationalists. We are told, for instance, that Plato is "the Adam of the philosophic race," and that "rationalism is the original sin which infected modern philosophy from its birth" (i. 6). His criticism of rationalism, although warranted in the main, fails to recognize that rationalism has always of necessity included an element of empiricism. It would also seem true that empiricism must allow some place to an element of rationalism. Dr. Tennant, in spite of himself, includes in his system this unescapable modicum of rationalism.

This he does by drawing a distinction between what is "rational" and what is "reasonable." In the second volume some things are accepted as reasonable which would have been rejected in the first volume had they presented themselves as rational.

All experience, for the empiricist, has its roots in sense-experience. "Knowledge may be compared with a house of many storeys, whose only entrance is on the ground floor" (i. 5). This means that "all concepts are derived from percepts" (i. 11), and that "there are no thought-given realities" (i. 65). Wherefore, it is in sense-experience that we must seek both the source and the test of all truth. Sense-experience, however, is far from being mere passive reception of impressions. Attention, interest, selection, memory, feeling—indeed, all the characteristics of experience at the higher levels—are already present in the rudiments out of which all experience is developed. Present also from the first, and all along the line, are what must be called "alogical" factors. This is most important to the conclusions later reached. Reason, we are told, "is an alogical as well as a logical process" (i. 185). This is another way of saying that the logical postulate of the rationality of the universe must be extended. It is an arbitrary procedure to demand that the world shall conform to our intellectual constructions. If there is any "rapport" between man and the world, then it is man as a unity—that is, man as a feeling, willing, thinking subject—who stands thus related to the world (i. 29). Accordingly, "the alogical is not unknowable"; indeed, "it is even possible that the alogical may have revelation value" (i. 341). This alogical factor in experience plays an important part in our interpretation of the world. "Our most important convictions, in science, philosophy, and theology alike, are partly due to causes other than logical grounds" (i. 10). The tirade against "formal" logic is bitter indeed. But equally severe are the strictures against science when mere "fictions" are mistaken for actualities, and "artifacts" for forthcoming data. This is an instance of Dr. Tennant's all-round fairness and consistency. Although he has genuine sympathy with science, he will not flatter her or hold silence when rebuke is deserved.

Since the foundation and method are the same in science and theism ("science and theism spring from a common root," i. 365), it may be helpful, as well as interesting, to listen at this point while science, so to say, returns the compliment paid to her by Dr. Tennant. Let Professor Julian Huxley be the spokesman for science.

"Confusion exists between two ideas of God. There is the idea of God as an absolute conception; and there is the idea of God to be derived from reasoning on the facts of nature and

the facts of religious experience. The first is alien to the scientific habit of thought; we are asked to build up God from our notion of what God ought to be, and then proceed to deduce consequences from this unverifiable idea: if there is a God, he must be all-powerful; if he is all-powerful, he could have prevented the war; and so on to an infinity of useless speculation. The other—but that would need a chapter. The great theologian of the future will be he who, boldly asserting that we can never know the nature of God as absolute, will put on a firm logical and pragmatic basis that highest synthetic concept of the human mind for which alone the word God should be reserved. That concept must be self-consistent throughout: it must take into account the facts of nature, cosmological and evolutionary; it must reckon with the desires and hopes, the struggles and weaknesses of the human mind, and with its *capacity for mystical experience*; it must never for an instant go beyond fact, but it must deal with the highest type of mental experience equally with the familiar and the physical. Such a conception, such a God will sustain the civilization of the future" (*Essays in Popular Science: Evolution and Purpose*, Julian Huxley, p. 187).

This quotation is of interest here, not only because it describes the aim and method of Dr. Tennant, but also because it shows a scientist offering more than Dr. Tennant can conscientiously accept. The italics are used to indicate the single point where Dr. Tennant would demur. He cannot attach quite so much importance to religious experience and the capacity for mystical experience.

Mysticism, and indeed all religious experience which claims immediate or intuitive knowledge of God, is found to be incompatible with empiricism. It therefore calls for rejection when we are seeking evidence of the existence and nature of God. Such experience lays claim to a doorway through the roof to the stars above, whereas, in point of fact, the only door is on the level of the earth beneath our feet. It is not denied that the mystic himself feels sure of God, and believes himself to have attained in a moment of ecstasy to a real union with God. But this is "certitude" only, and not "certainty." Certitude can be resolved psychologically, and is very different from scientific certainty. This feeling of certitude is called "psychic" in its unanalyzed state. It is "psychological" when analyzed, but then it gives no ground for certainty (i. 46). Further, the mystic experience cannot be isolated from the interpretation which the mystic himself gives to his experience. And not only does the interpretation come entirely from the subjective side, it also determines the nature of the experience. "The mystics have seen what they were by

education predisposed to see" (i. 319). And this is true of all religious experience, whether distinctly mystic or not. "Religious experience owes its uniqueness to the interpretative concept" (i. 326).

These are hard sayings and peculiarly distasteful in these times when so much stress is being laid upon the value of experience. Nevertheless, we find so eminent a psychologist as Professor Leuba saying that "for the psychologist who remains within the province of science, religious mysticism is a revelation not of God but of man" (*The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, p. 318). And the same conclusion has been reached independently by Dr. Waterhouse and Dr. Matthews, to mention no others. "The argument from experience," says Dr. Waterhouse, "naïvely stated, as if the subjective experience guaranteed the truth of the experient's own explanation, carries no weight" (*The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, p. 29). Dr. Matthews is equally emphatic: "I am inclined to wonder whether advocates of an uncritical acceptance of religious experience have ever troubled to learn by introspection what religious experience really is. It is surely a complete misreading of the order of events to suppose that experience comes first, and afterwards gives rise to beliefs about God and the world. . . . From the beginning religious experience is indissolubly connected with affirmations about the universe, which are capable of philosophical and critical interpretation" (*Studies in Christian Philosophy*, pp. 8 and 9).

These quotations are given to indicate that Dr. Tennant is not alone in challenging the evidence drawn from the mystics. But he goes beyond most other theologians in questioning whether there is any objective revelation conveyed through religious experience: "All discussion of the validity of religious experience is but a beating of the air" (i. 292). And this, of course, is the only inference consistent with his empirical standpoint. Dr. Tennant always has the courage to face the consequences of his philosophy.

A pitfall, unseen by so many who pin their faith upon experience, becomes evident enough to the empiricist. It is customary for the uncritical thinker to suppose that whatever manifestly comes from beyond his own individual experience must have issued from the great Reality beyond the human mind. But this is merely a failure to recognize that what is outside of every individual experience is not therefore of necessity also outside of collective social experience. The apparent objectivity may only be relative, social instead of individual, and no more real in an ultimate sense than any other private experience. It tells us something about social thought, but

gives no certain knowledge of any ultimate existent: "What is over-individual is not necessarily also over-social" (i. 155).

This fallacy just noticed has led to the supposition of some external, absolute moral law, existing eternally unchanged, and being quite independent of the human mind. The question "whether, in individual appreciation, feeling is constitutive of value, or only instrumental to apprehension of it" (i. 140), must be answered without making unjustified assumptions. There is no evidence forthcoming that the moral law is over-social. It acquires its authority from being over-individual. Accordingly, any reference to an ultimate moral category must be denied. Value is constituted by feeling, and is not apprehended as something given to human experience from outside. "Objective valuations issue from universal experience" (i. 143). They issue, that is to say, not from Reality but from society. Moral judgments, moreover, are not unique in character. Like everything else in experience, they are derived from sense-experience. Ethical judgments are based upon existential judgments. "Morality is conditioned by existential facts" (i. 144). What is desirable (despite Martineau's emphatic denial) is derived from what has first been actually desired. "From the desired to the desirable there is a way, but there is no deductive way back" (i. 153). The moral imperative, I ought, has its origin in a judgment of existence. "I owe is transmuted in virtue of existential presupposition into I ought" (i. 153). This means that Dr. Tennant assimilates right to truth and wrong to error. Right is truth in relation to personal action. Right, therefore, is no more revealed from above than truth is. Both have to be discovered. Both follow from inference upon sense-experience, and turn back again to sense-experience for their verification.

As it is with our knowledge of goodness, so it is also with our knowledge of God. Truth, goodness, beauty are not revealed; they are discovered by experience and afterwards verified pragmatically. In like manner the existence and nature of God must be inferred. But this does not mean that God is uncertain or a mere fiction of the human mind. We have no knowledge of the pure self, but by inference. "The pure ego, if known at all, and not merely thought or supposed, is but known about, mediately and reflectively or intellectually" (i. 77). Thus, in a sense, Dr. Tennant can say with Browning, "God and thy soul stand sure." But more than this: our knowledge of the external world comes also by inference or interpretation, and is qualified throughout by what Dr. Tennant calls "anthropism." "The world is intelligible only when it is interpreted, and interpreted in terms of what the human

ego at its level of self-consciousness knows itself to be" (i. 93). This interpretation, however, is not merely reading into nature a meaning that comes from outside of itself. Man is himself, in T. H. Green's phrase, "a part or product of nature." In man nature comes to herself and becomes vocal. "Personality is our highest interpretative category. For the theist it is the key to the universe. . . . The world itself has made imperative the interpretation of itself in terms of this concept" (i. 127).

It is necessary, therefore, if we would do justice to Dr. Tennant, to examine his theory of knowledge in relation to the self and the world, since, on his showing, our knowledge of God is in a like case. "Knowledge of God is in the same case as knowledge of the soul, of other selves, and of the realities behind the sensible worlds of individual experience" (i. 325). And again we are told that "at every stage the object of religious experience can be said to be derived by the soul from its knowledge of the self, humanity, and the natural world" (i. 328).

All this means that knowledge of God is a discovery, not a disclosure; an inference, not an intuition. Let us, then, look at the way in which knowledge of God is derived from the elements of common experience, and then afterwards notice what is implied by precluding any other source for our understanding of the being or nature of God.

Dr. Tennant is emphatic in rejecting the ontological argument for the existence of God. That method reeks of rationalism, and is therefore abhorrent to him. We are all, of course, ready to confess that what is proved by the ontological argument to have necessary existence is not what we mean by God. Dr. Tennant will not allow, however, that the existence of anything can be thus established. Perhaps this is another instance of his exaggerated reaction against rationalism. But be that as it may, the only course which he finds allowable is the humble way of advancing "reasonable grounds for belief" (i. 79). The theology which contends that the existence of God can be rationally demonstrated he repudiates. "Rational theology stands or falls with the ontological argument" (i. 79). And "the ontological argument being fallacious, the real existence of God enjoys no certainty superior to that of the existence of the world and of the soul" (ii. 253). This venerable argument abandoned, what remains? In Dr. Tennant's view we are left with an epistemological argument. The existence and nature of God are to be inferred from the "wider teleology" which he believes to be evident in the realm of nature (i. 82).

Many students have been greatly perturbed of late by the teaching of psychology, which seems to indicate that most of our supposed knowledge (and probably all of it) issues from

projection upon the world of what originates within ourselves. But whereas we are timid in these things, it is characteristic of Dr. Tennant that he gladly accepts whatever he believes to be sufficiently verified, be the consequences what they may. Here, for instance, he accepts the "anthropocentrism" of all our knowledge (i. 113 and 115), and uses that very fact as evidence of purpose in nature. The "forthcomingness" of our experience provides a pragmatic test which shows that in the main our anthropism provides true interpretations. And this is reasonable, since man is integral to nature. Since, then, our anthropism is through and through purposive, the verification of our anthropism over such wide fields of enquiry implies that nature also must be purposive. The kind of purpose which such verification allows is very different, however, from the "particular providence" of piety (ii. 203), and from the "design" of Paley's famous argument (ii. 84). What may justly be inferred is a "wider teleology," a purpose sufficiently general to allow ample scope for man himself as a genuinely free agent, and to allow also for the occurrence in nature of consequences which are no part of the general purpose. This general purpose is found to be the achievement of "moral character and moral progress as the best things which any world can realize" (ii. 186). But "a world from which the possibility of moral evil was excluded would be other than a moral order" (ii. 188). Thus, on the foundation of the wider teleology, Dr. Tennant erects "the wider theodicy" (ii. 198). Behind the purpose in the world we may infer the existence of a Moral Purposer, since purpose without a purposer is a mere abstraction of which we have no knowledge.

But even when we thus seem to be reaching out to God we must still bear in mind the conditions of our empiricism. "The attributes ascribed to God will be such as empirical facts and their sufficient explanation indicate or require" (ii. 78). Guided by this principle, we discover that God, or the World Ground, "in virtue of the possession of intelligence and ethical purposiveness, must needs be conceived in terms of the notion of personality" (ii. 166). The concept of the divine perfection, in order to have any acceptable meaning, must be qualified as moral perfection (ii. 148). Infinitude, as applied to God, can mean nothing if human freedom is to mean anything (ii. 173). It can only be accepted as a variant for perfection as already defined (ii. 143). Eternal is found to mean noumenal or ontal as distinct from what is phenomenal in experience (ii. 133). The idea of the absolute (that supreme fiction of rationalism) is found to signify just what we should by this time expect, and that is exactly nothing at all (ii. 160). God is not the

absolute absorbing the world into a kind of Nirvana. God is the creator and sustainer of the world. "God without a world is not God" (ii. 156, also 126). And the world is to be understood as "God's utterance" (ii. 173).

In this manner, always remembering that "the lock, not we, decides whether the key shall fit" (i. 67), philosophical theology gradually attains to the conception of God. But the conclusion reached by philosophical theology is hardly likely to satisfy dogmatic theology. In particular the interpretation of the Trinity and of the Incarnation will seem inadequate. The only doctrine of the Trinity which Dr. Tennant can recognize is modalistic monarchianism. He says "that tritheism is repugnant to the Church, and that orthodoxy, whenever it is not vacillating or vague, is as monarchian as Sabellianism" (ii. 268). Consistently with this conception of God, and also as a consequence of his theory of knowledge, it follows that the traditional teaching on the Incarnation is left without any support from empirical theism. From this standpoint "the doctrine of the Incarnation is above reason" (ii. 232). But this does not mean that the truth can be accepted as a divine revelation. For "empirically established theism is unable to find a place in its theology for alleged truth that is above reason" (ii. 238). And again, "No truth that is above reason can properly be said to be revealable" (ii. 239). What, then, we ask, is the significance of Christ? And the answer, as usual, is unequivocal and plain. "Theism may disown knowledge as to His being of one substance with the Father, or God manifest in the flesh. But it may regard Him as a manifestation of God in the flesh, and as the unique revealer of God" (ii. 240). But revelation, of course, is not the imparting of infallible dogma. The significance of Christ for our knowledge of God is to be found in Christ's unique knowledge of God. But this knowledge, we are to suppose, was reached by Christ in the same manner in which all knowledge of God is reached by us. The mind of Christ knew no other door than the single door that is open to every mind. "Christ revealed God in that He understood Him" (ii. 241).

So much for the conclusion reached by the empirical method of enquiry. It remains to notice one or two of the more important consequences which follow from the adoption of this method to the exclusion of any other. Already we have noticed the absence of objective revelation as contributing to the knowledge of God. Revelation is discovery. And yet it is not to be regarded as altogether unaided human discovery. "Revelation is more satisfactorily to be conceived, from the ethical point of view, as an enabling of man to get his own

insight, than as providing him with a substitute for it; as a seeking of free response rather than as a dictation of dogma; and as analogous to teaching a person to think for himself rather than to filling a pitcher with water" (ii. 232). Presumably, this enabling is not peculiar to religious knowledge. We are stimulated for our search after truth by the nature of that which is forthcoming in our experience of the world. If Dr. Tennant means merely that the forthcomingness of *sensa*, when interpreted as they needs must be anthropically, yields reasonable ground for the belief in a cosmic teleology, then such revelation as an aid to discovery is consistent with the principles of empiricism. If, however, he means more than this, then, in finding an explanation for an element in religious experience, he has been driven outside of his own philosophy. It is important to understand the manner in which man is enabled to discover the knowledge of God. Clearly this help supplied must be akin to grace and inspiration. Both experiences are explained, as doubtless they ought to be, in terms of personal communion. "Inspiration, grace, and revelation are . . . personal transactions with free persons, involving reception such as is more or less a rational and moral response" (ii. 230). This must be agreed to; and, further, the idea of irresistible grace, which means an overriding of our moral personality, must be rejected (ii. 222). But the question arises, What is the manner and what is the medium of the response between God and free agents? The world of nature, as we have seen, is God's utterance, and we are also told that in a qualified sense God may be said to be immanent in nature, since through Him all things "consist." But God cannot in any sense be immanent in man, otherwise man would cease to be a free moral person (ii. 214 and 223). How, then, is response between God and man effected? Is the response of grace just the immanence of God in nature and His disclosure of Himself as the purpose evident therein? Or is grace something more, some more intimate mode of fellowship? If grace means just the first, then empiricism is satisfied, but religion is not content; if grace means the second, then religion is satisfied, but empiricism has been transcended.

This idea of response, which seems to bring us to the very heart of religion, seems at the same time to lead us astray from the path of empiricism. Response means reciprocal action, a mutual outgoing, a true communion. Grace as God's response to man is answered in prayer as man's response to God. Dr. Tennant, however, has not dealt sufficiently with response as moving both ways. He rightly insists that "human receptivity and assimilation are involved in the imparting of religious

truth" (ii. 231). Yet this factor of human response calls for further examination. Human response and divine response do not seem to meet as they ought to do. Response as we know it in our experience, response between friend and friend, is more intimate than it would seem possible for response between man and God to be. Allowing that this intimacy in friendship is psychic merely and lacks psychological confirmation, it still remains true that empiricism can provide no language for intercourse with God which is half so expressive as the language by which we come to know each other. It is significant, surely, that prayer is not mentioned in the whole book. Is that because prayer knows another door to the soul besides the door upon the ground floor? It is certainly difficult to see how prayer could be given an adequate place in Dr. Tennant's theism. But already, in accepting grace, more would seem to be claimed than empiricism can allow. Perhaps Dr. Tennant means no more than consistency permits him. But it is difficult to stifle the suspicion that in the second volume his religious convictions have, at this point at least, proved too strong for his philosophy. The same thing happened, of course, with Spinoza (although he was a rationalist), when he reached the fifth book of his *Ethica*.

It is much to be desired that Dr. Tennant should give us a third volume to indicate how these principles of empiricism apply to the great doctrines of the Christian faith, as, for instance, the Fatherhood of God, the Atonement, and the Sacraments. It may be that what has just been said upon grace and prayer misrepresents the case. But until we receive further enlightenment from Dr. Tennant we shall feel the pressure of a dilemma—either we shall hesitate to say anything about prayer (following Dr. Tennant's example), or we shall fear that we are inconsistent with the principles of empiricism which Dr. Tennant has almost persuaded us are true. Either the world and humanity provide the only media for communion between our souls and God, or there must be some other contact between the human and the divine of which empiricism knows nothing, but which mysticism, despite all its inconsistencies, may have discovered. Is there no secret way by which the soul can escape to God and by which God can creep near to the soul? For piety there remains the psychic certitude of such a secret stair with a doorway leading into the very presence of God. But psychologically there is no certainty of this door. Ought religion, then, to abrogate its claim to truth and become the cultivation of a subjective certitude? Or ought religion courageously to recognize that there is no short cut to the knowledge of God, and contentedly seek Him by the laborious

way which alone offers a thoroughfare? According to empirical theism, "in this life our seeking rather than our finding is God's purpose for us" (ii. 208). But there may be a finding of God hereafter.

It is bracing and invigorating in the heights to which Dr. Tennant guides us. But it is also chilly and bleak. Some will feel that they have been helped to a fuller understanding of God, and such will feel an inexpressible gratitude. Most, however, will still prefer the sunny glades and the sacramental nearness, although the assurance thus felt is psychic only and lacks any psychological confirmation. Whether religion within the limits of empiricism contains all that is essential to religion may be questioned. But those who follow Dr. Tennant will discover that some at least of the foundations of religion are well and truly laid. But the position reached resembles so strikingly the confession of faith so finely given by Professor Julian Huxley in *Religion without Revelation* that we are confirmed in the conclusion that empiricism can go so far and no farther. To most minds this will seem to be a falling short. Yet it is true religion as far as it goes. How shall we be carried farther? "If philosophy tells us that we cannot attain to knowledge of God save through knowledge about the world and man, religion assures us that we cannot understand this world and the meaning of life, nor find life much else than vanity and vexation of spirit, apart from interpreting all in terms of the knowledge of God" (ii. 241).

CYRIL H. VALENTINE.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

WE should be grateful if correspondents who write on the subject of THEOLOGY would kindly address all communications *after January 21* to the Editor of THEOLOGY, The Deanery, Winchester. For some months we shall be residing in a smaller house near by, where letters addressed to the Deanery will be delivered. Until January 21 our address will be as hitherto.

We have received a copy of the November number of *La Revue Catholique des Idées et des Faits*, founded in 1921 under the auspices of the late Cardinal Mercier and published in Brussels. The journal is devoted to the cause of Reunion; and its editorial paragraphs contain a vigorous defence of Dom Lambert Beauduin, of the Benedictine house of Mont-César at Louvain, against recent attacks made on him and on others in the Roman Catholic press in this country. One could wish that the truth-loving, liberal, and charitable spirit of this journal could blow through the Roman Church in England: but at present the outlook is not hopeful. The recent action of the Bishop of Liverpool in drawing public attention to the behaviour of the English Romans in regard to marriage (*The Times*, December 3, 1930) was much needed: but it shows how much ground has yet to be covered before the dreams of Malines can be entertained. It is curious that a body normally so astute should not have realized that England is not to be won in that way |

Hosanna, A Book of Praise for Young Children (S.P.C.K.; Music Edition, 3s. 6d. and 4s.; words only from 4d. to 8d.), is the title of a collection of fifty songs and hymns for little children, together with some signals and marches. It is the work of Mr. T. Grigg-Smith, formerly Director of Religious Education in the Diocese of Manchester; the late Charles Wood, sometime Professor of Music at Cambridge; and Hubert Middleton, Organist of Ely Cathedral. The book is a perfect treasure: tunes and words alike are ideal for their purpose; and each page is decorated by the Chelsea Illustrators in a way that will go home to every heart.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

(a) St. John vi. 31.

Quite probably the manner of the miracle of the feeding of the 5,000 was no more apparent to the multitudes than the turning of the water into wine was to the governor of the feast (ii. 9); only they knew that Jesus had fed them, and had recognized it as the Messianic feast, and therefore had tried to get Him to accept the position of King. After they had been sent away, and during their search for Him again, opinions as to His being the Messiah would have been divided. Moses had promised a leader like to himself, and he had fed the people definitely and miraculously with food from Heaven. So they approach our Lord the second time with

this test; no loaves and fishes, but Bread from Heaven, is that for which they ask. Matt. xvi. 1 and Mark viii. 11 probably refer to the same test of His Messiahship.

E. A. IRWIN.

(b) Gal. iii. 20. ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστίν.

Migne calls this "obscurissimus locus," and Lightfoot says there are more than 250 interpretations of it.

One interpretation was given some time ago in this magazine by Dr. Lowther Clarke.* The Law "came through angels, through their representative Moses. God is one, and needs no representative, but a crowd of angels had to choose some one as their spokesman." He then refers to Heb. ii. 2, which he suggests is based on this passage, and this in turn on Acts vii. 53. He continues, "Spirits interested in human affairs have intervened and dictated all these ordinances. . . . God has *allowed* their intervention only. . . . Moses was a mediator between a host of angels on the one side and the nation of Israel on the other." Wilfred Knox, in the *New Commentary*, takes much the same view (p. 535).

These criticisms occur to me: (i.) A "crowd" needs a spokesman, but not necessarily a "mediator"; whereas an individual may quite well need a mediator with another individual:† (ii.) the text speaks of the Law as having been ordained "by means of" angels, not "by" them: (iii.) to belittle the Law is wholly contrary to St. Paul's attitude to it: he is strong against the false position claimed for the Law, as capable of justifying, but the Law itself he honours; see Rom. iii. 31 and 32; vii. 12, 14, 16, 22, 25; viii. 4, 7; ix. 31; x. 4; xiii. 10; Gal. iii. 24; 1 Tim. i. 8; and in the two texts referred to above its mediation through angels is mentioned as adding dignity to it.

Lightfoot's explanation is that a mediator implies two contracting parties, and that a contract is contingent for its validity on performance by both parties; whereas a promise, as emanating from one, is unconditional. Yet the Pauline writer to Hebrews considers "the word spoken by means of angels βέβαιος"; see also Gal. iii. 15.

Now what has St. Paul here set himself to prove? That Christ and those who belong to Christ are not under the dominion of the Law, or dependent on it for their hope, but can claim the Promise made by God to Abraham and to his Seed, Christ. But has not the Law invalidated, or at least conditioned, that Promise? No, he answers, because (i.) the Promise was to Abraham and to Christ, and the Law, intervening between the two, cannot annul it; (ii.) the Law was ordained in the hand of a mediator. Now there can be a mediator only between two parties, as between God and Israel: there cannot be a mediator between God and Christ, because Christ is God, and "God is one." Therefore the Law is not addressed to Christ: He and His are not dependent on it. If it be thought that this makes St. Paul speak of our Lord as God in a more absolute way than would be natural to him, one need only refer to the *ὅς ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων* of Phil. ii. 5 and *τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ* of Titus ii. 13.

G. H. TREMENHEERE.

* Since republished in *New Testament Problems*, p. 155. (S.P.C.K., 1929).

† In spite of Bengel's "*unus non utitur mediatore illo.*"

LAMBETH CONFERENCE REVIEWS

I.—THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD

(a) IN RELATION TO MODERN THOUGHT

(c) TO BE REALIZED THROUGHOUT THE CHURCH BY TEACHING AND STUDY

NEAR the beginning of the Encyclical Letter it is said that the function of the Church as a fellowship is "to bear witness to the supreme revelation of God—of His nature, His will, His kingdom—which has been given to the world in Jesus Christ our Lord." And apart from any question of success or failure in the work to which the Committee on "The Christian Doctrine of God" applied itself, we can have nothing but gratitude for the fact that this subject stood in the forefront of the proceedings of the Conference. It ought to do something to dispel the illusion that, whereas scientists and philosophers concern themselves with ultimate questions as to the nature of the universe, it is only in ecclesiastical matters of merely domestic importance that Churchmen find themselves at home. We may at times give ground for this impression; in so far as this is so, the Bishops will help us all to put first things first. To critics who read the pages of the Report it should at least be clear that whatever claims the Christian Church makes rest finally upon its claim to possess through its knowledge of God the one master-key which can unlock the doors of mystery within which the spirit of man is ever seeking to pass. This is not an irreligious age, if we judge by the widespread manifestation of religious quest; this fact is put prominently and well in the second paragraph of the Report. But the strength of religion and its hold upon mankind have not resided in the stimulus it has given to the search for truth; patient and heroic though that search has often been, Lessing's famous aphorism, in which he gave the preference to the search for truth as compared with the possession of truth, would be simply misleading (whatever be thought of it in itself) were it regarded as a faithful representation of what religion has meant in the history of mankind. Not the quest but the discovery, the finding of God, or, at the deeper levels of experience, the being found of Him, has been the secret of the religious tradition as we may trace its progress through the centuries. It is the Christian claim that this tradition is seen at its richest and best in Christianity, that there it is revealed as final and absolute religion. It is not my duty to comment on the section of the Report where this issue is or should be paramount: Professor Webb has written critically on the adequacy of it in a previous number of *THEOLOGY*; but I may say that, apart from the validity of its doctrine of God, the Christian religion can have no hope of survival: its doctrine is too distinct for Christianity to find a place in an international amalgamation of religions. It is of such a character that, if it be true, its illumination is necessary for the whole of life and knowledge. It is because of what is inherent in its nature, and not because of its particular correspondence with what seems to some thinkers to be involved in certain phases of modern scientific thought, that the Committee could express the conviction that "the Christian Doctrine of God, in its full implications, when rightly understood, supplies the guidance which our perplexed generation so supremely needs."

The rest of this section is an exposition, positively rather than dialectically given, of the truth of this statement in relation to the order of creation and to man's spiritual consciousness. The unity of the two fields emerges

through the apprehension of a progressive and purposive movement which "has culminated in the spiritual endowments of man." And religion itself is a history of upward movement. The Committee did not, I imagine, wish to take any particular side as to the nature of primitive religion; but the whole of man's religious history is viewed as a preparation for that Gospel which, when it came, was a new thing. For a new element entered into man's knowledge of God through the Incarnation. The limited knowledge which marked even the highest form of pre-Christian creed, that of Israel, and resulted in a correspondingly restricted view of the relations of religion and life, could not be the note of a religion which saw in the Person of its Head the fulness of the Godhead. At this point in the Report the emphasis falls, briefly but very forcibly, on the Logos-doctrine: the Johannine verse "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us" is interpreted as pointing to the "attainment of the purpose of the whole cosmic process through the agency of the immanent Logos or creative thought of God."

The Report goes on to show how from the Christian belief in the supreme revelation of God in Christ there sprang the doctrine of the Trinity, and the special contribution which Christianity has to make in face of the fact and problem of evil. This latter takes shape, not in a theoretical solution of the mystery of the existence of evil, but in the proclamation of the Cross as the summing-up of love's struggle against evil, wherein the victory rests with the love which through its creative power brings about new conditions in which "righteousness and love can be all-powerful." The section draws to an end with some wise paragraphs on the subject of man's communion with God. The shortcomings of pantheism are well stated: "the divine is not to be identified with nature, nor, in particular, with man"; "the results of God's creative activity must not be confused with His Being." The relation of mystical experience to practical religion is emphasised, while, as a further warning against any exaggerated stress upon that experience, it is affirmed that "there is nothing in Christ's teaching to indicate that mystical experience is the only or highest way of access to God."

Section (c) is partly taken up with an exposition of the causes of what are described as "some of the inadequate or unworthy conceptions of God current in the Church itself," partly with a consideration of some of the steps which may be used for the building-up of both clergy and laity in the true knowledge of God. There has been, it is urged, and still continues, an erroneous belief in "the equal authority of all parts of the Bible," while there has been much failure to test conceptions of God by what can be known of "the mind and temper of Christ." Various unfortunate results are noted as deriving from these initial mistakes. The suggestions for the gaining of a truer perspective, excellent though they are, do not seem to need any special notice in this article. But the final paragraph of the section deserves prominence. It embodies two convictions: first, "that it is by our presentation of God that the world will judge the message we are charged to bring." Whatever the method we employ, it is by the idea of God which we convey to men that we shall attract them to Him. Further, "the true presentation is to be tested by the impulse it creates to worship." This leads on to the fourth section of the Report, which has already been dealt with in this series.

I think that all who have read the Report will agree as to the ability displayed in the drawing-up of section (a). It is a closely knit and very

lucid piece of constructive exposition, well calculated to show that there is nothing trivial about the Christian doctrine of God. Probably one of the difficulties which some people experience today arises from the supposed inadequacy of the Christian doctrine when compared with the most recent scientific revelations of the mystery and the majesty of the universe. The old idea of *Di minorum gentium* seems to be reapplied in connection with what the Christian Church is regarded as teaching as to the relation of God to the universe: a more exalted conception of God is assumed to be necessary. But what is needed is not a changed and loftier conception, but the application of what has always been inherent in the Christian doctrine to the vision of the universe, as that is given in the presentation of the results of modern scientific investigation. It is a great task which awaits the Christian teacher, but part of the task is the correction of that ignorance of Christian doctrine which again and again is the most formidable obstacle which has to be encountered.

I turn to particular causes for gratitude. First of all I should like to apply more widely a warning as to undue emphasis which is given near the end of the Report. There it is said that "the arresting attractiveness of Christ's life on earth has led men so to concentrate their worship upon the human Christ as to obscure His relation to the Father." I am sure that there is a grave danger at times, in connection not only with Christian worship, but also with Christian thought, and with persons and movements of very different outlooks, to merge Theology in Christology. We need to remember, when we think of our Lord's divine Sonship and of that Sonship as manifested in a human life, that Christ is the Way to the Father, the Revelation of the Father, the Image of the Father. In this there will be no loosening of our hold upon the truth of Christ's Godhead, any more than that happens when we hold the truest form of Christian prayer to be prayer to the Father through the Son in the Spirit. What we are committed to as Christians (and so it has been from the beginning) is the truth that God, who, in relation to the universe, is both Ground and End, is also, to use the great New Testament phrase, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Report should help us to observe the due proportions of thought in this sphere.

Then, next, the greater the stress which is laid on the importance of the work that is being done in the departmental sciences, the more urgent is the need for a principle of synthesis. If the sciences do, indeed, give us a "consentient view of the process by which the world as we know it has come into being," the rational conclusion is that the order in which we live is a unity. Unity is, then, not a construction imposed in the interest of an idealistic theory, but appears in the course of scientific enquiry. The observed phenomena bring with them their own interpretation. The only alternative to this is to suppose that we are the victims of an extraordinary illusion, and that such a thing as a unified order of nature does not really exist. But, then, whence comes the illusion? It is the old trouble: arguments which destroy the rationality of the universe destroy themselves, since, if the universe is in itself irrational, there is no ground, no reason for trusting in any processes or conclusions of our thought in relation to the world. But if the world is truly rational and intelligible, what is the explanation? Are we not forced to admit what A. N. Whitehead has called the "principle of concretion"? And what are we to say about such a principle? It seems to me that in this field of thought the initiative is quite definitely possessed

by the exponents of Christian Theism. Doubtless, there are questions which they have to leave unanswered (the Committee wisely allow that this is so in respect of aspects of the problem of evil), but on the main issue, which concerns the order of the world and man's apprehension of it, the Christian teacher can give an answer which covers the ground with a completeness to which it is not easy to find a parallel. Science has not shown that, for the explanation of the world, God is unnecessary: and the Report should help towards the recovery of the Christian doctrine of God the Creator.

Thirdly, the brief, but important, statement of the relation of the Christian doctrine to the creed of Israel is very welcome. At any time there may appear the danger of a latent Marcionism, which tries to ignore the historical connections of Christianity with the history and the religion of the Hebrews. It is a hopeless attempt to evade facts. Neither dogmatically nor apologetically is it tolerable. Certainly, the true answer to those misleading conceptions of the equal authority of all the parts of the Bible to which the Committee alluded is not to be found in driving a wedge between the Old Testament and the New. What is needed is a fresh attention to the remarkable character of the religious phenomena of Israel and to the impossibility of understanding the specifically Christian revelation, if it is studied in isolation from that *evangelica preparatio*, of which the records are to be found in the Old Testament writings.

Finally, while there is no formal discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, the Report makes it quite plain that only through that doctrine does the Christian idea of God reach completion. I suppose that part of the difficulty sometimes felt with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity is due to the impression that it is an otiose addition to a conception of God adequate independently of it. But if we look to substance rather than to terminology, the creed of the New Testament is Trinitarian, and it is through the New Testament that the approach to the doctrine can best be made. From the first, the Christian religion developed on lines which inevitably led, when the time was ripe, to philosophical constructions of the doctrine. As to the value of the more purely speculative elements there will always be difference of opinion: but it is not on those elements that the stress falls in primitive Christianity. And if in modern thought interest is specially shown in the concrete character of religious experience as compared with metaphysical abstractions, the Trinitarianism of the New Testament ought not to seem remote from that interest.

There is, then, much cause for admiration and thankfulness in the nature of the Report. But it would hardly be possible that no criticisms should arise in a reader's mind. Where so great a subject is being expounded in but a few pages, it is certain that selection must be made as among the various aspects of the subject, and the attainment of a proportion satisfactory to all would surpass the powers of the ablest Committee. And the criticisms which I have to offer are of the nature of a regret that a place has not been found, or at least not adequately found, for sides of the doctrine other than those on which the emphasis mainly falls.

First, there is something reminiscent of the inadequacies of the Greek Apologists as well as of the nobility of that doctrine of creation which those writers shared with others of the Greek Fathers. There is a Christian cosmology, but the Christian doctrine of God is much more than the exposition of a true cosmology. And it is possible, in an apologetical

interest, to make too much of cosmology. The Apologists were not free from this fault, and I think that the same kind of defect is not absent from the Report. And in the Report the danger is that of an impression arising that the really important thing about the Christian doctrine is its character of a religious complement to the scientific view of the world. In so far as this is so, comparatively little stress will be laid on those elements in the doctrine which speak of God's transcendence and "otherness," of the contrast between His nature and the nature of the world. There is hardly anything in the Report which would strike a note congenial to one who had learnt to think of the doctrine of God in the school of Barth, or to one who felt that a place must be found in the doctrine for "eschatological" conceptions. The chosen line of thought is finely worked out—but it is only one line. Doubtless, it is the one most likely to appeal to persons who approach Christian doctrine through the sciences which lay special stress on process and order. To these the idea of the immanent Logos is naturally attractive, and when they think about the Incarnation they will probably think of it along Scotist lines. One does not want to deny the legitimate place of such thinking, but I think they can be quite safely used only if they are balanced by convictions as to the relation of God to the world which find too little expression in the Report, though they are in the forefront of the New Testament. And in this connection it is at least open to misunderstanding when it is said that "it is by our presentation of God that the world will judge the message we are charged to bring." The world's power of true judgment is a limited one, and it is not the Church's duty to lay most emphasis on those aspects of doctrine to which the world most readily responds. What the Committee had in mind might have been put more carefully.

Secondly, and arising out of what has been said as to the proportion of doctrine, it is a distinct loss that so little is made of God's redemptive nature and activities. But that is a part of the doctrine of God which ought never to be overlooked. Certainly, no one could overlook it in the New Testament. For the Christian Gospel the doctrine of God involves soteriology far more deeply than the Report makes plain. The section upon the Cross is not adequate. It would appear from the wording as though God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself by creating "the conditions in which righteousness and love can be all-powerful." That is, at least, not the whole truth. A more definite reference to the forgiveness of sins would have been very much in place. It would have meant a most valuable underlining of that evangelical tradition which sees the glory of God in the wonder of His grace; it is not the whole of the Christian tradition, but it is an indispensable side of it.

The Report should become the basis of much thought and teaching. It will be the business of the clergy to follow up its suggestions and to see that the most is made of all that it contains for the strengthening of Christian faith and devotion. Not for an age, but for all time, is it true, *Visio Dei Vita Hominis*.

J. K. MOZLEY.

REVIEWS

PSYCHOLOGY AND GOD: A STUDY OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF
RECENT PSYCHOLOGY FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND
PRACTICE; BEING THE BAMPTON LECTURES FOR 1930.
By L. W. Grensted. Longmans. 10s. 6d.

Professor Grensted's central thesis is stated more than once with admirable lucidity in the course of the book; it is that the key to the understanding of the phenomena investigated by psychology is only to be found in the recognition that they are expressions of personal relationships, of an ego-other urge, the "turning out from ourselves to others, and"—with whatever degree of awareness and intention—"to Another."

The author discusses in turn the principal conceptions and problems dealt with by all modern exponents of a truly dynamic psychology—a psychology, that is to say, which takes the mind seriously, and tries to interpret human behaviour in terms of knowing, desiring, and willing; and he pays particular attention to the psychological processes thus uncovered as they manifest themselves in the religious life. This task has been undertaken by the author's many predecessors in this field, though never, we think, with such knowledge and insight. The chapters on "Spiritual Healing and Psychological Process" and "Sin and Spiritual Direction" are particularly valuable. The former is an extraordinarily sane discussion of a topic on which few writers seem able to preserve a balanced judgment. Professor Grensted does well to insist that no evidential value can be held to attach to cures, even when they occur in a religious setting, which seem to be *merely* "miraculous"—"in that stupid sense of the word which identifies the miraculous with the unpredictable, arbitrary, and irrational. . . . Miracles of such a kind do not bear witness to the God of Christianity, but to a sheer and terrifying disorder at the heart of things. . . . Casual healings that save some and leave others of equal need and hope and faith are no witness to the love of God." Very important are the warning that "in any development of spiritual healing the Church should go far beyond the crudities of mere suggestion," and the writer's scepticism as to the value of "healing missions," unless they are from first to last "essentially acts of worship, expressing and evoking faith, and faith not in cure, but in God." The same chapter draws attention to the real bases of modern psychotherapy, whether by suggestion, or "re-education," or psycho-analysis: these are

the faith and hope of the patient directed towards his physician (this is most clearly seen in the "transference" by which, in analysis, the actual cure is accomplished). Such a personal relationship obviously makes it impossible to regard the physician's own ideals and standards as of no importance: "in a word, psycho-analysis"—and other forms of mental treatment—"must be firmly grounded upon religion." A similar point is well made in the chapter on "Sin and Spiritual Direction," where the author discusses the *liaison* between priest and psychotherapist. Some years ago the present reviewer, when acting as chaplain to a mental institution in the parish in which he was working, was advised by the superintendent to discuss as many subjects as possible with the patients—"except, of course, religion in any shape or form"! Professor Grensted rightly urges that "the real question is not whether the Church should interfere in the task of the doctors, but whether the doctors can safely do their work without the help of the Church. For when doctors leave on one side the essential character of sin they are condemning themselves and their patients to a very restricted view indeed of their problems." More might well have been said of the "real urgency that the clergy should have the knowledge that will enable them to understand the nature of" difficult, though not uncommon, types of mental disorder, which are frequently brought to them rather than to the doctors, at least in their early stages. Something, though all too little, is being done in this direction in one or two theological colleges, and in "refresher courses" for the clergy. Every priest ought to be able to recognize the first stages of such disorders. We think Dr. Grensted exaggerates the "religious values preserved in Christian Science." And we wish he had found it possible to include some discussion of demon-possession, or what is and has been believed to be such. To open the door too wide to the doctrine of demon-possession is, of course, to run the risk of people assuming that at least a great many forms of mental trouble are or may be due to this cause, and should be treated, not by psychotherapeutic methods, but by exorcism: to bolt and bar it, on the other hand, is to ignore a good deal of evidence, especially evidence provided by Christian missionaries in Africa, China, and elsewhere.

It is, however, on its theoretical, philosophical side that the book will, we think, be found most useful. Too many of us are content to erect bulwarks against modern psychology's attacks (whether expressed or implied) on the Christian view of life. Here, on the other hand, the war is carried at the outset into the enemy's country, and kept there. The reader is never allowed to forget that psychological study leads at every point

to facts which clamour for explanation, and are at the same time beyond the province of psychology to explain, but which neither the psychologist nor any other reflective man ought to be content to ignore. The fundamental fact is that human character is the result of personal relationships, and it is the harmonious or distorted ordering and functioning of these that the psychologist is studying. The problem is the problem of personality, characterized, as it is seen to be, by faith and love (in lower or higher forms), by the self's urge to seek satisfaction in other selves. Challenged to provide a hypothesis which shall be adequate to these facts, the non-theistic psychologist can only (with the Behaviourists) say that he is not interested in them, or (with Freud) vainly attempt to combine a vague hope in a good time coming with belief in a rigid determinism, or (with Jung and Adler) offer for our acceptance the conception of an impersonal, unconscious, racial "life impulse" striving to withstand hostile "Nature." "Behind all the new psychological terminology," says Professor Grensted, "is the problem of the nature of reality." The psychologists, in face of that problem, speak with many and conflicting voices. Only the hypothesis of Christian theism really gets to grips with it: "The theories of the psychologists are incomplete unless there is something within the inner character of reality itself which underlies the creative appearance of life and explains the predominance of faith and love." The greater part of the two last chapters in the book are devoted to the vindication of this hypothesis. Its culminating point is a brilliantly argued defence of the claim that Jesus Christ is the key to the interpretation of ultimate Reality, the final justification of the conviction that God is Love. And He is this because "in His life we see the problems of our own lives wrought out in an achievement of personality incomparable and complete. . . . This is humanity at its highest level, and, though such heights are utterly beyond our attaining, we know that He has revealed the purpose and possibility of our own immeasurably less effective lives. We claim, therefore, that here, if anywhere, it should be possible to discover the secret of personal being, and therewith the secret of that reality within which persons have come to be."

On one difficult question Professor Grensted seems to carry his admirable caution a little too far—that of mysticism. In the chapter on "Objectivity in Religion" he seems to admit that the mystical experience is, at least in some cases, what the mystics themselves assert it to be, an immediate intuitive experience of the presence of God. But he is (rightly) so anxious not to leave any loophole for the false notion that the

mystical is the *only* real experience of God—he quotes Hocking's description of *all* experience, religious and other, as experience of God—and to guard against delusion and auto-suggestion, that he explicitly rejects the traditional conception of "degrees of orison," saying emphatically that "vocal prayer . . . is the highest prayer of all, and not merely an elementary stage." Here Dr. Grensted is indeed, as he recognizes, "speaking contrary to all received religious opinion." We should ourselves hesitate to ignore the view, universally held by writers on mystical theology, that the "higher" reaches of the prayer life are "infused"—bestowed by God on certain chosen souls, and experienced always as an "invasion" from Beyond. It is a matter of vocation. Such a view need not in the least involve, of course, that all claims to such experience of the mystic way must be taken at their face value.

CYRIL E. HUDSON.

MYSTERIUM CHRISTI. Christological studies by British and German theologians. Edited by the Bishop of Chichester and Professor A. Deissmann. Longmans. 15s.

The religious and theological situation in post-war Germany is still somewhat of a mystery to those of us who had some acquaintance with the Evangelical Churches and teachers of that country before the war, but have had little opportunity of renewing that acquaintance since. Twenty years ago, when the present reviewer studied at the Universities of Strassburg and Berlin, the religious environment in which he found himself was easily comprehensible. There were no sects; in each of the constituent states of the Empire Protestant Christianity was organized in a single *Landeskirche*, to which nearly every Evangelical Christian belonged as a matter of course, which was under the supreme control of the local ruler—King, Grand Duke, or Prince—and which in practice tended to be regarded as the State department for promoting religion and morality, much as the army was regarded as being the State department for ensuring national defence. Though formally committed to Lutheran orthodoxy, through the acceptance of the Catholic Creeds and the Confession of Augsburg, these "National Churches" were nevertheless in a state of considerable doctrinal uncertainty, due to the breakdown of the two authorities on which traditional Lutheranism had relied—namely, the verbally inspired Bible and the teaching of the "godly Prince," the former having been undermined by criticism, lower and higher, and the latter having fallen into desuetude owing to the godly Prince's preoccupation with more secular matters, political

or military. So far as any one point of view could be said to prevail, it was, in the sphere of doctrine, that of a moderate or central Ritschlianism, which conceded the "value" of God to our Lord, but refused to predicate metaphysical Deity of His Person, and which consequently held a purely "economic" view of the Trinity (so far as it could be said to hold any Trinitarian conception at all) and a purely subjectivist view of the Atonement. "Glauben Sie an der Gottheit Christi?" a Catholic student once naïvely said to me. "Das ist merkwürdig: die Protestanten glauben nicht." In Biblical criticism, the dominant school was that of which Harnack was the brilliant and unquestioned chief, though a more old-fashioned orthodoxy and a more conservative critical position were worthily championed by the veteran Theodor Zahn, still happily with us. But since the war this relatively simple picture has been broken up by the emergence of new factors of all kinds. The political revolution which followed upon the Armistice has banished even the name of the "godly Prince"; and the present Republican Governments do not accept even formal responsibility for the well-being of the Church or for the purity of its doctrines, though financial subvention of its ministers has not been so far withdrawn. As a consequence, the *Landeskirchen* have ceased to regard themselves merely as departments of the State, and have begun to develop a true Church-consciousness. Connected with these events, doubtless, is the remarkable "High Church Movement," of which the best-known leader is Professor Heiler, and which is striving for the enrichment of Lutheranism by the restoration of Episcopacy and the liturgical treasures of Catholicism. In sharp opposition, as it would seem, to this stands the, perhaps, even more remarkable movement headed by Karl Barth, which represents a revival of the fundamental ideas of Calvinism expressed in modern terms. And the critical situation, so far as the Synoptic Gospels are concerned, has been revolutionized by the emergence of the *Formgeschichtliche* method, which goes behind the work of the higher critics, and breaks up the sources into "pericopes" informed by a controversial, parænetic, or evidential purpose, in such a way that no single saying or doing of the historic Jesus remains beyond the reach of serious doubt. Those who have not spent any length of time in Germany since the war may well wonder what has been the total effect of these various new forces upon Evangelical thought; and they will welcome this book, in the first instance for the sake of its German contributions, as likely to throw some light upon the question.

The book begins with an essay by the most distinguished of its authors, Professor A. Deissmann, on the "Name of Jesus"

The Professor illustrates the pre-Christian use of the name in Hellenistic Jewish circles from his unrivalled knowledge of the papyri, ostraka, and inscriptions, and has no difficulty in showing that, as being the Græcized form of "Joshua," it was one of the commonest of Jewish names. He brings out the interesting fact that the life of Christ had the effect of bringing its ordinary use to an end, in Christian circles for obvious reasons of reverence and amongst the Jews through motives of abhorrence. These facts are skilfully marshalled so as to form a contributory argument in support of the historicity of the Founder of Christianity, and in opposition to the "Christ-myth" theory (which seems to have been taken much more seriously in Germany than in England), according to which "Jesus" was first a cult-name, or name of a deity, and then became the name of a supposedly historical individual. Actually, the facts point in precisely the opposite direction: the name was first of all a name of ordinary use, and then became a cult-name. The traditional German interest in the concrete life of our Lord, indicated by this introductory essay, is carried on and emphasized by Professor Kittel, who convincingly overthrows the popular antithesis between the "Christ of faith" and the "Jesus of history," and refutes the suggestion that St. Paul was not interested in the latter. Professor Sasse examines the bases of the primitive Christian faith that Jesus is *ὁ κύριος*, and sees in the Aramaic formula *Marana' 'atha* a proof that this faith goes back to the very morrow of Pentecost. These bases he finds in the facts of the Resurrection and the Exaltation of Christ. We notice with interest his insistence that Resurrection and Exaltation are two facts, and not merely two aspects of one fact, an insistence which may be claimed as justifying the efforts which are being made here to promote the observance of Ascension Day (which is still a public holiday in Protestant Prussia). The Easter appearances were constitutive of the Apostolate, and were therefore not merely "prophetic" visions; we welcome, in passing, confirmation from an unexpected quarter for the view which some of us have been at pains to maintain in recent discussions of the Ministry, that Apostles and Prophets really are two distinct orders in the Church of Christ, and not one. We are especially glad to see that Professor Sasse explicitly repudiates the conventional "Liberal" view that the Easter message was no more than an assurance of the immortality of the spirit of Jesus. He does not, however, make clear his attitude towards the "empty tomb," and is content to affirm that the Resurrection was an indescribable act of God which was not witnessed, and cannot be defined, by any human being. The distance which separates the writer

from the conventional Liberalism of twenty years ago, and the degree of his approximation to the full Catholic doctrine, may be judged by the following quotation: "For faith there is no tormenting contradiction in Jesus Christ belonging both to time and to eternity, but it is only the expression of Him as true Man and true God" (p. 111). Professor Althaus's essay on the Atonement is more difficult to understand, partly because of the obscurity of his style, which employs words like "meta-ethical" (to which the present reviewer finds himself quite unable to assign a content), and partly, we cannot but suspect, because his work has suffered in translation. What, for instance, are we to make of the statement, which appears to be one of the foundation-stones of his doctrinal construction, that our Lord wrought the Atonement by "sanctifying" the will and the wrath of God? How can the will of God be "sanctified"—i.e., made holier than it already is? It is, however, clear that the author stands far nearer to traditional modes of thought and feeling about the Atonement than did the late Dr. Rashdall; for he expressly rejects the view that the parable of the Prodigal Son refutes the objectivist soteriology of St. Paul. In this writer, as in others, we notice the tendency so characteristic of German dogmatics and so difficult for the English divine to understand or appreciate—the tendency to ascribe to the works of Luther a kind of normative authority which we should never dream of attributing to Hooker or Jewel. The concluding essay is the work of Professor Heinrich Frick, and treats of the Second Coming in a vein characteristically blended of fervent meditation and abstruse metaphysical speculation. It is gratifying to note that (if the essay is at all representative) Christian eschatology appears to be coming into its own again as an object of dogmatic belief and not merely of historico-critical investigation; but Professor Frick leaves us with no very definite guidance as to how the *Parousia* and the coming Kingdom of God should be conceived, or whether the Second Coming is to be extra-temporal or the last event in time. The broad general impression left on my mind after a perusal of the five German contributions to this symposium is that Evangelical thought in Germany is undergoing a strong reaction against the unsatisfying negations of nineteenth-century Liberal Protestantism, and a strong attraction towards the supernatural, miraculous, and personally divine Christ of the old faith; though this has not involved, so far, a revival of respect for conciliar definitions as such or of interest in the metaphysic of Nicæa and Chalcedon.

The greater part of this review has been devoted to the German essays for the reasons stated in the first paragraph, and

also for the reason that the British writers are men of established reputation, whose characteristic points of view may be deemed to be already sufficiently well known to readers of THEOLOGY. But three of the British contributions appear to the present reviewer to stand out for various reasons. The essay entitled "A Modern Approach to Christology," by Professor Nathaniel Micklem, seems to us to be strongly humanitarian, indeed psilanthropic, in its conclusions, and to represent precisely that old-fashioned Ritschlianism which (if the German contributions to this work may be taken as typical) its native land appears to be deserting. Dr. Mozley expounds the necessary mutual implication of the traditional Christology and the traditional soteriology with his accustomed erudition and power. But, in our opinion, the best thing in the book is Dr. Rawlinson's essay entitled "Corpus Christi," written with a grace, lucidity, and expository skill which make it delightful reading after the more ponderous and obscure essays of the Germans; its most significant passage may here be quoted. "It was not the death upon Calvary *per se*, but the death upon Calvary as the Lord's Supper interprets it and gives the clue to its meaning, which constitutes our Lord's sacrifice. The doctrine of sacrifice (or of atonement) was not, as I believe, read *into* the Last Supper; it was read out of it. It was the Lord's Supper which afforded the clue" (p. 241). We hope that Dr. Rawlinson may find time to develop this most interesting and suggestive thesis more fully. The Bishop of Chichester contributes as an epilogue some wise words regarding the place which theology should hold in the life of the Church.

In general, and leaving out of account the essay just mentioned, it does not seem to us that this volume, for all its learning, makes any very notable or epoch-making contribution to theology. But the fact that it could have been written at all by scholars belonging, not merely to different communions, but to two nations which a few years ago were locked in deadly conflict, is fraught with a great hope for the ultimate restoration of external Church-unity between the races which they represent; and, if the essay "A Modern Approach to Christology" be regarded as an exceptional aberration, it shows that unity of faith in large measure already exists.

N. P. WILLIAMS.

NOTICES

THE GRACE OF GOD. By N. P. Williams, D.D. Longmans, Green and Co. 4s. net.

The fifteenth centenary of the death of St. Augustine is an opportune moment for the reconsideration of the doctrine of grace in its historical and traditional aspects, and few are better qualified for the task than Dr. N. P. Williams. In the volume before us, in Mr. Prestige's admirable series, the author has carried another stage his analysis of the complex theological development set forth with great learning in his *Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, and if the present work is less pretentious than his Bampton Lectures, it is both lucid and constructive. Few writers are more successful in presenting theological subtleties in intelligible terms, and if here and there the argument tends to become obscure, the cause lies in the nature of the metaphysical speculations under review, rather than in the exposition of the present writer.

Starting from the primitive magico-religious conception of a mystic impersonal force or *mana*, as one of the earliest attempts to evaluate the sacred and mysterious, Professor Williams proceeds to an investigation of the evolution of this concept through Christian theology. Ranging himself on the side of the Greek Fathers, Cassian, Scotus, the Franciscans, Melancthon, Arminius, and Wesley, he contrasts the robust common-sense of these "once-born" religious thinkers with the tyrannical and immoral conception of God involved in the doctrine of predestination and irresistible grace as set forth by St. Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. In the identification of grace with the Third Person of the Holy Trinity, the author sees the surest safeguard against this "twice-born" theology of St. Augustine, and the more extravagant "supralapsarian" doctrines of Calvin and Beza. The various forms of "synergism" which tried to find some place for freedom within the closed system of prevenient grace are discussed, and in the final chapter Dr. Williams' own view is set forth in terms of modern psychological thought.

By equating grace with "the one glorious sanctifying Divine Power which our Lord and His Apostles call the Spirit," the mechanically impersonal concept disappears at once, and the work of grace becomes the operation of the one creative and redemptive divine Spirit manifest in emergent evolution, and made accessible to man through the sub-conscious. Dr. Sanday's theory that the sub-conscious in man is that part of his personality which is most accessible to direct Divine influences is confronted with serious difficulties by reason of the very mixed character of the subterranean regions of the human mind, and we look forward to a future volume in which Dr. Williams will deal with this aspect of the problem. It seems that so many of the sins which so easily beset us have their home in this very sphere alleged to be especially under the influence of Divine activity, and it is usually largely through conscious effort that the grace of God operates in the human soul. We do not forget, of course, the place of the sacraments in the process, and we hope that Dr. Williams will supplement his stimulating volume by a fuller treatment of his theory of sacramental grace in terms of psycho-therapy.

E. O. JAMES.

THE CALVERT SERIES. With prefaces by the General Editor, Hilaire Belloc. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 4s.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ART. R. A. Cram.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CURRENT LITERATURE. G. A. Shuster.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE DESTITUTE. John O'Grady.

This is a delightful series, both in appearance and in subject-matter. Editor and publishers alike deserve congratulation. The Editor's prefaces alone would make the series striking. Needless to say, they breathe the characteristic spirit of the school which that brilliant Medievalist adorns. Civilization means Latin Catholicism, and it must quickly awake to the fact or it will be the worse for it. His answer to the question, Why has the Church acquiesced in so much debased art since the Reformation? is remarkable: it is "the effect of the wound" inflicted by that "blast of anarchy" called the Reformation. Mr. Cram diagnoses the present situation in art as the deliberate rejection of any ideal of beauty at all, and after an admirable historical account of the arts which flourished under the moulding influence of the Catholic Church, comes to an interesting practical suggestion. This is the creation, under Pontifical authority, of a Catholic School of Christian Art at, *e.g.*, Oxford or Rouen.

Mr. Shuster frankly states the facts of the case in respect of contemporary Catholicism and literature, but believes that the present "soul-hunger" will lead to a greater appreciation of what the Church has to offer through literary channels. He does not, however, pretend that anything less than a rediscovery of "the sublime" on the part of Catholic authors will really bring letters and Catholicism back into their true relationship. Probably the most interesting chapter to the general reader will be that on The Index of Forbidden Books.

Mr. O'Grady's treatise, full though it is of valuable information, is necessarily of less general interest than the two already mentioned, inasmuch as a large part of the book is devoted to a description of the organization of Roman Catholic Charities in the United States. Mr. Belloc, however, provides the atmosphere. In his preface he shows civilized society making its choice between Communism, Slavery, and Catholic Culture. If that is really the question at stake, it is clear that no subject could be more important than that of Catholic sociology.

K. D. MACKENZIE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRAYER BOOK. By F. W. Vroom, D.D. S.P.C.K. and C.E.S.S.I. 3s. 6d.

This book, by the Archdeacon of Nova Scotia, is a welcome sign of the growth of liturgical interest and activity on both sides of the Atlantic. As one Church of the Anglican Communion after another revises the Prayer Book and adapts it to her own needs, it becomes increasingly hard for a popular writer to note the variations without falling into the sin of dulness. Dr. Vroom perhaps only just avoids this difficulty when, taking the 1662 book as his basis, he not only deals with that of 1928, but also casts side-glances at the American, Canadian, Scottish, and Irish revisions, and, as far as it has gone, the South African. But he writes in a fresh and interesting style, and the historical and explanatory information given, while containing little that is new to liturgical students,

is full and, as far as it has been possible to test it, accurate. Chapter II., on Liturgical Worship in Early Days, is particularly good, and might with advantage have been enlarged to include a fuller description of typical Eastern and Western Services.

In one respect the author does himself an injustice. He is constantly quoting authorities without giving references, and the result is an impression of paste and scissors work, which is unfair to the genuine research which he has employed. Moreover, some of the names referred to do not carry great weight, and the sentiments quoted are often what he could have said quite as well or better himself. This is the chief blemish on an otherwise excellent book. If the suggestion is not indelicate, Dr. Vroom would do well to follow the example of those parent birds which swallow and digest the food they have collected and then regurgitate it for the benefit of their nestlings.

One or two slips may be noted. On p. 28 it is implied that the present Scottish Liturgy is a revision of that drawn up in 1636. (This is usually dated 1637, and is so described on pp. 148, 152.) But although in a sense descended from that rite, its true parent is the Scottish Communion Office of 1764, which was largely influenced by the Non-Jurors and differs considerably from its predecessor. The Laudian form follows that of 1549 in placing the Invocation of the Holy Spirit before the Words of Institution: this was reversed in 1764. The new American book does not, as is stated on p. 45, contain the Blackletter days, but, like the Irish, omits them. On p. 158 it should have been made clear that the Invocation is not confined to the East, but, apart from the Roman rite, was common in the West as well.

J. C. DU BUISSON.

GOD IN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE. By W. R. Matthews. Nisbet. 10s. 6d.

The contributors to the Library of Constructive Theology, in which Dr. Matthews' new book appears, are agreed that "religious experience is to be taken as the starting-point of theological reconstruction." The work of the theologian is for them the criticism and interpretation of experience, rather than the double task undertaken by the scholastic, the metaphysical proof of God's existence by the use of "pure reason" and the defence of revealed truth declared by authority. It would, in our view, be a pity if the empirical and the rational were to become rivals instead of allies. But it is well to recognize the superior appeal of the empirical method to the "modern mind," accustomed as it is to the success of the method in the sciences, and ready to reconsider the claims of theology, if theology is the formulation and rationalisation of religious experience.

Dr. Matthews' book is an admirable specimen of the way in which the empirical method can be and should be used. Its sober judgment and sound basis in philosophical scholarship, its sensitiveness to religious values and feeling for tradition, are qualities as marked as its constant reference to the data of religious experience. The appeal to experience does not mean for Dr. Matthews the evasion of the claims of reason, or any undue exaltation of feeling. Indeed, his conception of religion is somewhat too intellectual. Religion is presented in the first chapter as an anthropomorphic interpretation of Reality, and as providing satis-

faction for two salient needs of the spirit, "the need for unity and the need for the substantiation of value." These are illuminating ideas, but we must certainly add to them another idea, not so prominent in Dr. Matthews' exposition, before our interpretation of the religious consciousness can be adequate. The specific *differentia* of religion, we suggest, is worship: until the spirit of adoration descends upon them, the intellectual search for unity of experience and the ethical demand for the objective reality of moral values remain what they are by nature, branches of philosophy rather than manifestations of religion.

But it is pardonable in a philosopher that he should be primarily concerned to expose the philosophical content of religion, especially if he does it with the candour of Dr. Matthews, and (we may add) in such firm and lucid prose. And we have very much to thank him for in this book. He is dealing with a vast subject, and inevitably the discussion would benefit in several places if it had more room to expand. Yet there is no shirking or skimming; the whole is a balanced survey, the fruit of mature reflection and compact wisdom. The first third of the book is a penetrating analysis of religious and Christian experience. There is an admirable statement and defence of the "anthropomorphism" of religion, and Christianity is regarded as "the highest form, the logical outcome by a kind of spiritual dialectic, of that anthropomorphic tendency" which is apparent in the Hebrew prophets and elsewhere. Side by side with this anthropomorphism in the doctrine of God is the theomorphism in the doctrine of man. "'Let us make man in our image'; and the Son of Man the express image of the invisible God: upon these two conceptions turn the Christian doctrine and experience of God."

The middle chapters (v.-vii.) are largely concerned with critical estimates of other theological constructions. Dr. Matthews' criticism of the Platonist and Aristotelian influences on Christian theology will seem unsympathetic to some, especially in view of the revived interest in scholasticism at the present time. There will be more general approval among Christian thinkers of the short but excellent defence of Christian theism against certain modern philosophical views, such as the neutral monism of Mr. Bertrand Russell, the naturalism of "emergent evolution" theorists, and the various Hegelianisms from Bradley to Gentile. The doctrine of transcendence is stated firmly, but with careful precision, and immanentist systems such as Alexander's, the popular "life-force" theories, and the historical idealism of Croce are faithfully dealt with.

The pressure on the author's space is perhaps most apparent in the remaining five chapters, in which he deals with divine personality, the Holy Trinity, the crucially important idea of creation, the problem of evil, and the intricate matter of God and time. But though the treatment is all too short, it never fails either in lucidity or in acumen; and it is not the least of our debts to Dr. Matthews that he has not been afraid to put together, in easily accessible form, so much that the Christian teacher needs to know and reflect upon. With this book and Professor A. E. Taylor's masterly essay in *Essays, Catholic and Critical*, no one need complain that the Catholic faith about God lacks modern exponents as intelligible as they are profound.

H. BALMFORTH.

SELECTED WORKS OF RICHARD ROLLE, HERMIT. Transcribed with an Introduction by G. C. Heseltine. Longmans, Green and Co. 8s. 6d.

This is a very interesting collection of some of the shorter works of Richard Rolle and should do much to stimulate that interest in his writings which the work of Dr. Hodgson and others has aroused.

Some of the pieces herein contained have already been published in a modernized form. "The Commandment," "The Form of Living," "The Virtues of the Holy Name" and "Ego Dormio" have all been edited by Dr. Hodgson; "Ego Dormio" and the "Meditations on the Passion" by Mgr. R. H. Benson; and "The Amending of Life," by Miss Comper. The remainder are now offered for the first time to the modern reader, and they constitute the real interest of the book. The three "Short Pieces" are very characteristic of Rolle, and the "Notable Treatise on the Ten Commandments" forms a good pendant to "The Commandment," but best of all are the Commentaries with which the book ends.

We have been introduced to the Hermit's way of commenting on Holy Scripture by his version of the Penitential Psalms published by Dr. Hodgson two years ago, and those who have used this little book know its value. Here we have a constellation of twelve similar Commentaries on the Songs of Isaiah, Ezekiel and Hannah, the two Songs of Moses, the Prayer of Habakkuk, *Te Deum*, *Benedicite*, *Benedictus*, *Magnificat*, *Nunc Dimittis* and *Quicumque Vult*. They are of real devotional value, and we owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Heseltine for making them accessible and intelligible to us.

The collection is furnished with a graceful Introduction (as was to be expected from an editor of "The Christmas Book"), which, while it contains nothing markedly original, draws our attention to those facts about Rolle and his teaching which we most need to keep in mind in reading his works and so fulfils its purpose excellently.

It is impossible within the limits of this notice adequately to criticize Mr. Heseltine's text. He describes it as "a translation rather than a literal transcription or a modernization in the customary manner." He has based his work on the best text, manuscript and critical, that is obtainable, but his method of using it is admittedly free and, to some minds, perhaps too free. He endeavours to present Rolle's *meaning* rather than his *ipsissima verba*, and "to this end it has often," he says, "been necessary to depart entirely from Rolle's own phraseology, and on that account many long passages in this transcription will look quite unlike the original version. . . . I have endeavoured to convey in my own words some of the strength and character of Rolle's prose."

Whatever may be said of the rightness or wrongness of this proceeding, it has at least two unfortunate results in that the uncritical reader has no certainty in any passage whether the voice is that of Jacob or Esau, and in many cases the rhythmical English of Rolle gives place to a rendering which, though idiomatic and graceful, is quite unlike it.

One may be pardoned for thinking that previous "translators" of Rolle have not made quite such a hash of things as Mr. Heseltine suggests, and one notes that his own relentless modernity breaks down from time to time. We should not nowadays speak of "skilful prayer," nor is "full dear" exactly current coin.

In spite, however, of any criticism which an old-fashioned student may suggest, this is an attractive volume and one which should stimulate the devotion of readers who will use it in a devout and uncritical spirit.

F. P. HARTON.

THE FULLNESS OF SACRIFICE. An Essay in Reconciliation. By F. C. N. Hicks, D.D., Bishop of Gibraltar. Macmillan. 15s.

This book may prove to have made a distinctive contribution to the co-ordination of modern Christian thought. Certainly in attacking the problem of the sacrificial idea, specially in its Eucharistic expression, the Bishop of Gibraltar strikes closely home at a potent cause of our chaos. It is impossible to summarize here the whole course of his complex, but never obscure, argument. His thesis, however, amounts to this: An adequate knowledge of the technique and terminology of sacrifice precludes the notion that its ultimate purpose was the death of the victim. Killing was but one of the preliminary stages of the whole sacrificial act, which included the offering and certain applications of the blood as the "life," and the sacrificial meal of communion in which the unity of the society with, and within, the divine life was realized. The development of the idea from primitive sacrifice and its ethical sublimation in the Jewish system are carefully traced; and Dr. Hicks offers valuable correctives to the notion that there was any fundamental opposition between prophet and cultus.

The book reaches absorbing interest as the author proceeds to relate the historic sacrificial procedure to the main problems of Atonement and Eucharist in Christian thought. That our Lord conceived His own Person and work as of sacrificial implication, and that the New Testament writers justly interpreted His purport, themselves displaying a consistent accuracy in the use of technical language, Dr. Hicks may be said to demonstrate; and he concludes that as our Lord fulfils the ancient sacrifices, so they necessarily help to interpret Him.

This brings us to the Eucharistic problem. The argument is that the Church rightly linked the Eucharist with recessive stages of the whole sacrifice, communion, offering, and, eventually, with the slaying of the victim; that, owing to the lapse of sacrificial technique, Christian writers came to equate sacrifice with death alone; that this raised insoluble problems in the Middle Ages; and that both Romans and Reformers were involved in the same misconceptions, which allowed no logical halting-place between a theory of repeated immolations and Zwinglianism. Dr. Hicks would have us regard the Eucharist as the Church's participation in the heavenly completion of that sacrificial act which was begun at Bethlehem, and continued at Calvary with an immolation which can never be repeated.

The consequences of the late and false equation of sacrifice with death are admirably set forth. One consequence was a particular problem of the Eucharistic Presence. We may grant that this book clears away many problems concerning the sacrifice; but we are not convinced that the Bishop is justified in supposing that he has indicated equally sure ground for general agreement as to our Lord's Presence in the Sacrament. His argument involves that Presence, but we may doubt whether it will silence controversy as to certain related practices. Problems in other fields are here involved, which the Bishop does not discuss. But the book must be praised. It repays the most careful reading, and we close it with a sense of real gratitude.

W. G. PECK.

[This must be regarded as only a preliminary notice of a book of great value and importance, to which we intend to return in due course.—ED.]

A PEOPLE'S BOOK OF SAINTS. By J. A. Bouquet. Longmans. 7s. 6d.

This very attractive volume would be a specially suitable book to put into the hands of intelligent adolescents of the educated class, for the "lives" are not only interesting in themselves, but supply an enticing introduction to a further study of Church history. Mr. Bouquet has flung his net wide. Of his thirty-nine saints, the majority have been rightly chosen from the great names of the English Church; but the saints of the early Church and of other European countries have their representatives too. In addition to the actual life-stories of his subjects, the author provides much interesting information as to the times in which they lived and the memories they have stirred in later generations. The style is simple and graceful; and while the book is "good to the use of edifying," it is not oppressively so. Print and binding are attractive, and there is abundance of good illustrations, including reproductions of two of the noblest of Dürer's woodcuts.

C. S. PHILLIPS.

THE TEACHING OF KARL BARTH. An Exposition. By R. Birch Hoyle, A.T.S. S.C.M. 7s. 6d.

The Archbishop of York, in his brilliant sermon at the opening of the Lambeth Conference, said: "The great issue for religion in our day is not to be found in our differences about sacramental doctrine; it is not to be found in our disagreements about validity of ministries; it concerns faith in the living God"; and the whole sermon, with its insistence on the majesty of God, was an impressive plea for a theocentric religion. We are familiar with the stress on this same truth in all the writings of von Hügel; and it is a truth which specially needs emphasis in an age when constant attempts are made to explain religion in terms of psychology, and when "social Christianity" is sometimes proclaimed in a form which seems almost to reduce God to the position of a necessary instrument in the establishment of a Golden Age for man.

Continental Protestantism, largely through the influence of Schleiermacher, had drifted further from theocentric religion than any type of English religion; and it is because Karl Barth and Emil Brunner represent a strong reaction against this tendency that they have become in a very few years a tremendous power in Germany, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. Mr. Birch Hoyle has done excellent service in giving an exposition of the main elements of this teaching to English readers; and it is greatly to be hoped that the publication of this book will be followed by the issue of further English translations of the writings of Barth and his friends.

It is interesting to notice that Barth regards Descartes as "the fountain-head of the current of thought which has made man the centre of interest and displaced God from His due place in human thinking." Here he is on common ground with the French Catholic thinker, Maritain; but whereas for Maritain the moral is that we should return to Scholasticism, and Luther is bracketed with Descartes as a main source of error, Barth urges a return to Luther as the remedy for man-centred religion. But Barth and Brunner, in their reliance on Neo-Kantian philosophy, with its complete divorce between faith and reason, seem unable to shake off entirely the tradition which springs from Descartes.

Barth insists (rightly) on the importance of the transcendence of God, with its corollary that worship is man's primary response to Him; here he is on common ground with von Hügel's teaching that "religion is adoration"; and we welcome the recognition of this in the statement in the Lambeth Encyclical that "the Church's chief duty is to love and worship God." An important deduction from this for Barth is that God can only be known by revelation, and is in Himself not only unknown but unknowable. In one sense this is certainly true: but Barth seems to ignore the fact that man is not entirely passive in his acceptance of revelation; and English thinkers have learnt from Professor Clement Webb the impossibility of such a sharp cleavage as Barth makes between revelation and discovery. Further, as Mr. Hoyle points out, "Barth's emphasis on the absoluteness of revelation prevents his dealing with the converse aspect that the appropriation of that revelation by men, believing men, can only be piecemeal and fragmentary." He therefore fails to give adequate recognition to the truth of God's *gradual* self-revelation to man.

But Barth is no abstract thinker; his concern is first and always with the *preaching* of Christ. Thus he says that "Church preaching is the starting-point and is the practical end of *dogmatik*." It is because he approaches from this angle the thought of God's transcendence that the issue is a "theology of crisis," with a strong emphasis on eschatology. In Mr. Hoyle's words, "the Last Things, instead of being relegated to the few closing pages of text-books of systematic theology, are brought into the very centre of themes of discourse from the pulpit." Professor Bultmann, one of Barth's disciples, expresses this as follows: "Jesus looks on man as standing in the crisis in his Here and Now; through his free act man has the possibility of deciding (*Entscheidung* = crisis). This alone that the man does gives him his value." This insistence on the truth of Divine Judgment is timely, and recalls the teaching of von Hügel in his well-known essay on Heaven and Hell. It has a close parallel in the criticism from a Continental Catholic of a type of piety which lacks "the seriousness of the Last Things, the fear of the coming Judgment, a fear which even the most pious Christian cannot escape, and the constant struggling and straining after the Last End" (Karl Adam, *Christ and the Western Mind*).

The Barthians are certainly obscure in their teaching about the place of history in the Christian religion; and even after reading Mr. Hoyle's exposition we shall be obliged to reiterate Dr. Mozley's statement that Barth's attitude is "baffling." Perhaps, as Mr. Hoyle suggests, Barth makes it more baffling through his desire to avoid metaphysic. But it seems fairly clear that the main points of his doctrine are: (1) That Christianity need have no fear of free historical criticism; (2) that the *mere* "Jesus of history" discovered by synoptic criticism is not a complete picture of the Christ; but (3) "not from the historic picture of Jesus in the earthly life alone, but through the picture developed by the apostolic witness of the resurrection, sketched in the Gospels, comes the essence of revelation and faith" (Brunner). But there seems to be no adequate recognition of the work of the Holy Spirit in manifesting our Lord through His Body, the Church.

Mr. Hoyle deserves our gratitude for introducing Barth to a wider circle of readers; and on the whole he has done his work well. But there are badly ungrammatical sentences on pp. 58 and 68 (the former in a

translation from Barth); and it is with some amazement that we learn on p. 256 that " ' grace ' has almost ceased to be current coin in theological speech."

PERCY HARTILL.

THE SENSE OF GLORY. By Herbert Read. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

Though, in the post-war world, "glory" is a term sadly out of fashion, it has a definite and a fine significance, and it is much to be desired that its true meaning should once more be recaptured and understood. Mr. Herbert Read has thus done service to his generation by examining again the work of a number of writers to whom the word "glory" was almost more pregnant than any other. His book consists of a collection of critical essays on writers as far apart in time and manner as Froissart and Henry James. Some of his authors, such as Sterne and Bagehot, are only included by courtesy in a volume with such a title, and though Mr. Read is invariably interesting in his criticism, he is undoubtedly at his best when dealing with those to whom glory was avowedly the ruling passion of life.

Thus, his best and most illuminating essays are those on Froissart and Malory. They are the great laureates of the Age of Chivalry. Both had saturated themselves in that strange and decorative phase of mediævalism. Both rested secure and serene in their certainty that the phase deserved and would enjoy "a settled glory." Neither seemed conscious of the ethical weaknesses of chivalry, even seen at its best. Neither understood that there was a glory in resignation just as much as in violent and selfless action, the glory won by the Christian saints.

In Mr. Read's phrase, Froissart meant by glory, "the measure of all things and the crown of all virtues." For Malory it was "the radiance of virtue." But whereas Froissart's use of the word shows that in his mind glory is nearly synonymous with the fame that is not merely notoriety, Malory carried the development of the idea many steps further by disassociating glory and fame, and thinking of glory not so much as a virtue to be won as an integral part of the knightly character, a natural and unconscious grace interwoven in the very being of all "men of worship." By a man of worship Malory meant one who by his deeds had made himself worthy of the love of his fellows. Worship might be written Worth-ship. It was not honour paid, but glory deserved.

If it was Mr. Read's intention to reformulate the essential meaning of the idea of glory by reference to writers to whom that idea had a rich significance—and the title of his book certainly suggests it—there is a strange omission from his company of writers, the author of the Fourth Gospel. For glory is just as much a keyword of that Gospel as is Light, Life, and Truth. "We beheld his glory," says the prologue. When the various references to glory have been gathered and cited, it will be seen that the writer interpreted the glory of the Lord under three main aspects.

Two of the three are precisely the views of glory held by Froissart and Malory—Worthy Fame and the sense of Worth-ship (ii. 11, viii. 50, xiv. 13, xv. 8). But the third sense in which the word is used is much more suggestive, and the first hint of its significance is to be found in the fact that the nearer the story gets to the Passion the more frequently

is the word glory used, and that when once the Crucifixion is over it is used only once, and then in reference to it. We may be perfectly justified when we speak of "the glorious Resurrection," for to use the adjective to describe a victory wrenched from the very jaws of defeat is to follow the example of most of the world's great literature. But it is not to follow the example of the author of the Fourth Gospel. For him the essential glory of the Lord was won on Good Friday, not Easter Day. "We beheld his glory." It was on Calvary they saw and understood.

One example out of many must suffice. At the Last Supper the door had no sooner closed on Judas than Jesus, knowing that execution was now inevitable, burst forth in a strain of passionate exaltation: "Now is the Son of Man glorified, and God is glorified in him, and straightway shall he glorify him." Here and, for instance, in the episodes described in vii. 39 and xii. 20-29 we are on ground where the definitions of Froissart and Malory do not apply. In that scene alone something is revealed of the nature and price of glory at its highest, of which neither dreamed. It is plain that to this writer the glory of Christ, the natural grace of His supreme worth-ship, was manifested supremely on Calvary in a sense and degree in which it was not manifest at any other time.

"The paths of glory lead but to the grave." It is true in a sense which Gray did not suspect, nor Malory, nor Froissart. A study of *The Sense of Glory* which does not include the greatest of all its laureates, the author of the Fourth Gospel, is manifestly incomplete. If Mr. Read is called upon to prepare a second printing of his book, which is very much to be hoped for, may we, without intending either irreverence or impertinence, suggest that he adds to it an essay on the treatment of the word in the Fourth Gospel?

ROGER B. LLOYD.

DAS MÖNCHTUM UND DIE EVANGELISCHE KIRCHE: EIN BEITRAG ZUR AUSSCHIEDUNG DES MÖNCHTUMS AUS DER EVANGELISCHEN SOZIOLOGIE. By Friedrich Parpert. E. Reinhart. 3.80 Marks.

Christianity contains two tendencies which are at once complementary to each other and yet compelled to struggle against each other. The one tendency is ascetic, is world-denying, is heroic; the other tendency is humanistic, is world-accepting, is compassionate. The ascetic tendency looks back to the perfection which the Lord sets before His disciples in the Sermon on the Mount, and willingly sacrifices all to achieve that perfection. It knows no half-measures and will suffer no lukewarm disciples. The humanistic tendency looks outwards upon a suffering world and seeks to draw all men into the kingdom of God's love even at the price of compromising the Gospel. Both tendencies have their origin in the teaching and example of the Lord; both are to be found actualized in the primitive Church. But then the primitive Church was small and enthusiastic. It was almost inevitable that as the Church developed the two tendencies should be increasingly emphasized over against each other. Out of the ascetic tendency came the flight to the Thebaid and the beginning of monasticism. Out of the humanistic tendency came the world Church with all its compromises and the secular priesthood. Yet the two tendencies did not fall apart. In Catholic Christianity they became two grades—the religious and the secular—within the one Church. In the monasteries were gathered the heroic

spirits who were willing to devote their lives to the imitation of Christ in evangelical poverty, chastity, and obedience. And from the monasteries went forth all those reform movements which ever renewed the life of the mediæval Church. For the perfection of the Sermon on the Mount was not for the few alone. Within the monastic movement there lived the same humanistic appeal that was the chief characteristic of the world Church. Thus the development of monasticism revealed an increasing attempt to make the ascetic ideal possible for all. St. Francis of Assisi, through the third order, sought to make the whole world Franciscan. The Reformation itself is to be understood as a further attempt in the same direction. It was Luther the monk, reacting against the worldliness of the Roman Church and against the double level of religious and secular, who tried to create an evangelical Church in which the double level of religious state would be no more. This attempt failed because the same forces which had gone to make the Roman Church worldly began to operate within the Lutheran Church; while, because monasticism had been excluded from the Lutheran Church, the striving for perfection, which in Catholicism had found expression in the monastic orders, in Lutheranism broke away from the Lutheran Church and formed the sects. Thus the sects are on Protestant ground the equivalents of the religious orders on Catholic ground; but they are in many ways less satisfactory, and not least because the heroism which in monasticism operated to the renewing of the Church, in the sects merely weakened the Church by drawing off the more heroic spirits. Thus Lutheranism may yet be compelled to start monastic orders to overcome the sectarian tendency.

Such is the theme of Parpert's brilliant little essay, which examines in some detail Luther's attitude to monasticism and the consequences of the exclusion of monasticism from Lutheranism. And for the Anglican Church, which has suffered so greatly from the schism of the sects, and in which monasticism is beginning once more to play an important rôle, the theme of this book is of considerable importance.

J. O. COBHAM.

DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE OF THE MANUSCRIPTS IN THE LIBRARY OF LAMBETH PALACE. Part I. By M. R. James and Claude Jenkins. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

Archbishop Richard Bancroft (1604-1610) is to be regarded as the founder of the Library of Lambeth Palace. That Bancroft should have been a diligent collector of mediæval manuscripts is in itself a fact which carries with it some suggestions. It would be interesting to know the means by which he secured for the Church so many MSS. which had once belonged to the Augustinian priory of Lambeth. One is tempted to think that not only the beauty of these things, but their contents, must have been dear to the mind of the Archbishop, of whom it may be said that he preserved for Laud the possibility of a Catholic revival. The MSS. which Archbishop Abbot (1562-1583) added to Bancroft's collection can hardly be supposed to have made an appeal of such a kind to Abbot, the former opponent at Oxford of the rising liberal theology. The Editors hope in the final instalment of the *Catalogue* to provide a detailed history of the Lambeth collection as a whole. For the appearance of that instalment we may have to wait some years, for in its present part only 97 MSS. out of 1,221 are dealt with, although it is true that the "Codices Carewani" (596-638) have been calendared as short papers, and will

therefore not be dealt with in the *Catalogue*. Several of the MSS. described in this part of the *Catalogue* are not only "exceeding magnificent," but are of "fame and of glory throughout all countries." The decoration of the books has supplied plates for works by authorities on mediæval art, and the texts have been collected by scholars. A feature of no small interest in this *Catalogue* is the witness it bears to the deep interest taken by Archbishop Sancroft in Lambeth documents: "Contents by Sancroft" is frequently recorded. Dr. Claude Jenkins is to undertake the description of MSS. of post-mediæval date, while Dr. M. R. James the Provost of Eton's work will be confined to the mediæval section. The cost of printing has been generously provided for by the Carnegie Trustees.

WALTER K. FIRMINER.

REMINISCENCES AND REFLECTIONS FROM SIXTY YEARS OF LIFE IN IRELAND. By H. Kingsmill Moore. Longmans, Green. 12s. 6d.

No one who wishes to know the history of the Church of Ireland during more than two generations can afford to ignore this wise and witty volume which Dr. Kingsmill Moore has written. True, this communion is that of the minority, and of a diminishing minority, in the Free State. Yet it is surely well that a man who has lavished his powers in the service of this Church should set down a record that richly deserves to be read. The life-work of the author lay in the Training College of the Church of Ireland, where the teachers in Church schools received that foundation of secular and religious knowledge that did—and does—so much for the Church of their baptism. The guiding spirit of that splendid college has been the author, and we have met many of his pupils who have borne testimony to all he has done for them. In his turn he is willing to bear testimony, and he singles out two men who steadily stood behind him—Lord Plunket, Archbishop of Dublin, and Sir Frederick Falkiner, the Recorder. Nothing is more admirable in this book than the care taken to pay tribute where tribute is due. Nor could it be an Irish book without stories. May we give a couple? Primate Marcus Beresford was the first to preside at the General Synod, and he proved an able chairman of a body he did not particularly like. Once, when a prominent professor asked how long the Synod would sit, his reply was: "Geese generally sit four weeks." The professor promptly rejoined: "Not when they have an old fox among them." A deputation of Nonconformists came to suggest to the Primate that with the Disestablishment the title "Church of Ireland" should cease. He replied: "I have heard of a certain man who fell among thieves. They robbed him of all his possessions, but they made no attempt to take away his name."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.